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Discovery Hydraulics
Seth Katsuya Endo*
Discovery reforms invariably have unexpected consequences. But the
growth of electronically stored information has led to one constant — an
ever-increasing pressure on the finite resources of both the judiciary and
litigants. Courts, through their discovery rules, direct where that pressure
will be channeled. However, like any force in a closed system, it must be
sent somewhere, ultimately requiring difficult tradeoffs amongst the three
mainstay procedural justice norms of accuracy, efficiency, and
participation. Discovery Hydraulics explores this phenomenon,
cataloging how recently proposed or implemented document discovery
reforms affect these norms.
In creating the first purposive taxonomy of recent document discovery
reforms, Discovery Hydraulics makes three main contributions to the
literature by: (1) articulating an understanding of how the treatment of
costs and information volume correspond to the accuracy, efficiency, and
participation norms; (2) systematically collecting and organizing the
plethora of suggestions that have been offered to address the burdens
associated with the growth of electronically stored information; and (3)
laying out the normative and instrumental benefits of discovery reforms
that focus on reducing costs without losing information. Last, but not
least, a significant practical benefit is that this analytical approach should
provide courts with the tools needed to assess, ex ante, the potential
normative effects of changes to document discovery processes.
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assistance from Ryan Weller and administrative support from Piper Meikle and
Audrey Montes de Oca was essential to this project. The truly outstanding editorial
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INTRODUCTION
Efforts to reform document discovery — to address changes in the
broader world — inevitably have had unexpected consequences.1 But
one constant in contemporary civil litigation is that the continuing
growth of electronically stored information (“ESI”) places pressure,
which cannot be avoided, on both the judiciary and litigants.2 Instead,
at most, procedural rules can direct the stress, roughly prioritizing the
attendant normative and practical tradeoffs.
In this way, civil discovery acts like a hydraulic system.3 The finite
resources available to litigants are subjected to ever-increasing
pressure by the massive volume of ESI.4 Moreover, the courts direct
where that pressure will be channeled through their discovery rules.
1 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of
Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753, 760-85 (1995) (arguing in 1995 that the
unintended consequence of mandatory disclosure, introduced by the 1993
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, would be to reduce the number of
settlements in cases where no real discovery cost would otherwise have been
incurred); see also Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A
Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 221530 (1993) (describing how compulsory alternative dispute resolution processes may,
in direct opposition to its goals, actually reduce settlements and disadvantage
financially less well-off litigants); Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication
and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation,
75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1320-21 (1995) (suggesting that a rule limiting the number of
interrogatories to reduce litigation costs might actually increase them by making trial
more attractive and reducing the number of settlements). See generally Geoffrey P.
Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1986) (explaining how
Rule 68 can distort settlement offers rather than encourage settlement).
2 See ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INSIDERS’ GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED REVIEW 1
(2015) (describing problem of voluminous ESI); Seth Katsuya Endo, Technological
Opacity & Procedural Injustice, 59 B.C. L. REV. 821, 851-62 (2018) (discussing how
burdens of ESI have led to normative tradeoffs); Judge Andrew Jay Peck, Foreword, 26
REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014) (noting that “[t]he amount of digital information that is
created everyday is staggering, and many companies preserve almost everything”).
The growth of ESI, of course, is not the only external pressure. See, e.g., Richard D.
Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 65 EMORY L.J. 1491,
1491-92 (2016) (discussing the perception that excessive caseloads are a problem for
the judiciary as a driver of procedural rule changes). And the procedural justice norms
are not the only legal values burdened by ESI. See, e.g., Natalie M. Banta, Death and
Privacy in the Digital Age, 94 N.C. L. REV. 927, 928-30 (2016) (describing impact of
ESI on privacy rights).
3 This, naturally, is meant to evoke Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The
Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1705-08 (1999)
(explaining, in the context of campaign finance regulation, that “the desire for
political power cannot be destroyed, but at most, channeled into different forms” and
“political money, like water, has to go somewhere”).
4 See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.B–C.
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But, like any force in a hydraulic system, it must be channeled
somewhere.5
This metaphor illuminates a fundamental reason that federal reform
efforts have not ameliorated lawyer and judicial discontent with
document discovery. While there has always been dissatisfaction with
how the document discovery rules allocate costs and benefits,6 the
tremendous growth of ESI has created a new world where the
overarching problem is not intentional discovery abuse but merely the
inability of traditional practices to keep up with the explosion of the
universe of discoverable material.7 Thus, discovery reform efforts
cannot target a set of bad actors or some misconduct. Instead, they
necessarily must make difficult tradeoffs between the procedural
justice norms of accuracy, efficiency, and participation.
With increasing competition between important values, procedure
jurisprudence and scholarship have had to pay commensurately more
attention to discovery reform. In the past three years, there have been
over a hundred law review articles that either propose or evaluate rule
changes or related doctrinal developments.8
While prior scholarship has surveyed the significant shifts in federal
civil procedure under the Roberts Court9 and proposed different
5 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505 (1947) (“The deposition-discovery
rules create integrated procedural devices.”). The intention of the chief drafter of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to create an integrated set of discovery rules is
discussed further in Charles E. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting
Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 502 (1950).
6 See, e.g., Victor Marrero, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV.
1599, 1607 (2016) (“Commentators have repeatedly noted the persistence of
unhappiness and faultfinding with federal procedures despite perennial efforts to
address the problem through new rule amendments.”).
7 See Peck, supra note 2, at 2-3.
8 This estimate follows from a Westlaw search in the Secondary Sources database
for “DISCOVERY” within the same paragraph as “RULE” and “DOCUMENT!” and
“CHANG!” or “AMEND!” or “MODIF!” within the same sentence as “2015.”
9 See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal
Rules and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731,
1764-65 (2014) (arguing that decisions construing Federal Rules 8, 23, and 56
illustrate how conservative Supreme Court justices have “steadily and methodically
remade the law to serve the substantive policies and partisan values of the
contemporary Republican ‘conservatism’ from which they sprang”); Sarah Staszak,
Procedural Change in the First Ten Years of the Roberts Court, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 691,
692 (2016) (identifying how Chief Justice Roberts has used his power to appoint
individuals to the Judicial Conference and its subcommittees to inform the trend
towards more limited court access); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The
Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1885-88 (2014)
[hereinafter The Fourth Era] (linking procedural developments in the Rehnquist and
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theories for interpreting procedural rules and changes,10 this Article is
the first to engage in a purposive taxonomy that links recent
document discovery reforms’ treatment of cost and informationvolume to the likely normative effects.11 The goal of this taxonomy is
to provide courts with a tool to assess, ex-ante, the potential normative
effects of discovery processes.
As to the taxonomy, most of the recently proposed and
implemented reforms can be divided into three categories. The first set
of reforms places new limitations on the amount of discovery,
reducing the direct litigation costs at the expense of potentially
missing out on valuable information.12 These are meant to privilege
efficiency and mostly ignore structural inequities amongst the
parties.13 The second set of reforms tries to reduce costs, without
losing the informational benefits of the expanded universe of
discoverable material, by using tactical or technological innovations
like sampling and predictive coding.14 These reforms attend to

Roberts Courts to describe a new period of procedure that puts case management
above merits determinations); Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil
Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 331-32 (2012) (describing trends in the
Supreme Court’s then-recent civil procedure jurisprudence, including an apparent
hostility to the use of litigation to vindicate rights).
10 See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Civil-Izing Federalism, 89 TUL. L. REV. 307, 310
(2014) [hereinafter Civil-Izing Federalism] (identifying concerns underlying
procedural decisions by the Roberts Court); David Marcus, Two Models of the Civil
Litigant, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 537, 538-39 (2015) (explaining how the Roberts Court
has emphasized individuals’ control over their participation in litigation); Lumen N.
Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2167,
2167 (2017) (distinguishing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from statutes and
suggesting that an administrative law approach is the best way to interpret the Rules);
Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 125-26 (2015)
(describing two methodological approaches to procedure taken by the Roberts Court);
Dana Shocair Reda, What Does It Mean to Say That Procedure Is Political?, 85 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2203, 2203-05 (2017) (assessing the political nature of procedural reforms).
11 The Article looks back at a sample of proposed and implemented reforms for
the federal system from the past decade, using the 2006 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as a rough start to the formal e-discovery era. See Kenneth J.
Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 172 (2006)
[hereinafter December 2006 Amendments] (noting that a package of amendments
addressing “the myriad issues associated with the discovery and production of
information in digital form” would go into effect on December 1, 2006).
12 See infra Part IV.A (describing reform proposals).
13 See Part IV.A; see also infra Section II.C (explaining relationship between norms
and treatments of cost and information volume).
14 See infra Part IV.B (describing reforms proposals).
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efficiency but also may enhance accuracy and participation.15 The
third set of reforms focuses on the underlying pragmatic concern,
proposing ways for the courts to reallocate discovery costs between
the parties.16 The accuracy and participation implications are least
apparent, but the proposals should enhance efficiency.17
Part II of the Article briefly describes the underlying procedural
justice norms generally embodied within discovery and the rules
governing document discovery. Part III of the Article details the
growth of ESI and explains the pressures it places on discovery in civil
litigation. Part IV presents a critique and taxonomy of recent reforms,
suggesting that courts should focus on the set that attempts to reduce
discovery costs without losing the participation benefits that come
from robust discovery. Part V concludes with a summary of the
previous points, a discussion of the broader implications, and some
questions for future investigation.
I.

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE NORMS & DOCUMENT DISCOVERY RULES

An underlying premise of this Article is that document discovery
reforms should be evaluated by how well they serve the underlying
procedural justice norms animating the rules and doctrines.18 To
anchor this approach, this section begins by briefly explaining the
three mainstay elements of procedural justice — accuracy, efficiency,
and participation. It then provides a short history of the document
discovery rules. Finally, it explains how the procedural justice norms
are embodied within the existing document discovery rules.

15 See Part IV.B; see also infra Part II.C (explaining relationship between norms
and treatments of cost and information volume).
16 See infra Part IV.C (describing reforms proposals).
17 See infra Part IV.C; see also infra Part II.C (explaining relationship between
norms and treatments of cost and information volume).
18 See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE
L.J. 561, 567 (2001) (noting that “[s]cholarly debate about the procedural system
traditionally has focused on second-level analysis, taking for granted the underlying
normative goal structure on which generalized rules ultimately are premised”).
Implicitly, this Article applies a variant of Hart and Sacks’s Legal Process/purposive
approach. See William L. Reynolds & Spencer Weber Waller, Legal Process and the
Past of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REV. 1811, 1815 (1995) (“A Legal Process judge, in short,
engages in what Hart and Sacks call ‘reasoned elaboration’ — honest, that is to say
forthright, explanations of why the facts will lead to identified goals.”).
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A. Procedural Justice Norms Background
As used in this Article, the term “procedural justice” speaks to the
reasonableness and fairness of judicial methods and practices.19 In
assessing these two dimensions, the Article relies on Professor
Lawrence Solum’s seminal work in which he identified participation,
accuracy, and efficiency (described as “balancing”) as the three norms
comprising a robust notion of procedural justice.20 And, as described
below in Subsection II(C), the discovery jurisprudence, which
effectively mirrors the general process test in Mathews v. Eldridge,
weighs these norms when addressing disputes over scope.21
The participation norm captures the benefits of process that are not
reducible to either accuracy or cost.22 It is “the right to observe, to
19 See Civil Procedure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Justice, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Victor D. Quintanilla, Taboo Procedural
Tradeoffs: Examining How the Public Experiences Tradeoffs Between Procedural Justice
and Cost, 15 NEV. L.J. 882, 889 (2015) (“Procedural justice research measures the
extent to which the public experiences legal procedures and dispute resolution as fair
and legitimate.”).
20 Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 237, 237, 244-60
(2004) (explaining goal of incorporating accuracy, balancing, and participation
models of procedural justice “into a unified theory of procedural justice”). Other
scholars have articulated other discovery-specific norms. For example, some scholars
identify the value of truth-seeking. See, e.g., Yitshak Cohen, The Issue of Document
Disclosure in General Courts and in Family Courts: A New Model, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 43,
60 (2015). Professor Martin Redish laid out a more granular description, contending
that the procedural rules regulating discovery should promote the following high-level
goals: “(1) decisionmaking accuracy; (2) adjudicatory efficiency; (3) political
legitimacy; (4) maintenance of the substantive-procedural balance; (5) predictability;
and (6) fundamental fairness.” Redish, supra note 18, at 594. Each of the additional
norms has its own meaning and importance. But, for the purposes of this Article, the
truth-seeking norm is effectively co-extensive with Professor Solum’s accuracy norm
and Professor Redish’s third through sixth norms comfortably fit under Professor
Solum’s participation norm.
21 See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (noting that the
trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of
parties affected by discovery); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976); Sky
Angel U.S., LLC v. Nat’l Cable Satellite Corp., 296 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding
that the benefit of the requested discovery was outweighed by the burden and expense
it would impose upon potential deponents); Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the
Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4
(2010) (showing how Twombly turned on how the Mathews factors applied to whether
more discovery was due). But see Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search
of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 46-47 (1976) (critiquing Mathews for using
an incomplete utilitarian approach).
22 Solum, supra note 20, at 275. At the same time, Professor Solum asserts that the
participation principle does not rely on dignity, equality, or autonomy grounds. Id. at
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make arguments, to present evidence, and to be informed of the
reasons for a decision.”23 And the participation norm serves multiple
functions within traditional civil litigation, both enhancing the dignity
of the individual and contributing to the outcome.24 To the former,
giving an individual who is affected by a decision the opportunity to
have a voice implicitly assigns a sense of worth to the individual. It
also leads to an individual’s greater satisfaction and perception of
fairness with the process, regardless as to whether they win or lose.25
To the latter, processes that permit participation give litigants a chance
to influence the outcomes of their cases, which may also improve the
chances of a reasoned and accurate decision.26
Turning to accuracy, this norm focuses on whether the process
improves the chances that the adjudicative proceeding’s outcome will
be substantively correct.27 In other words, the goal is to ensure that
the decision relies on an understanding of the information that best
reflects what actually happened and that the reasoning is logically
sound.28 Processes that enhance accuracy contribute to the legitimacy
of judicial decision-making because individual litigants see their
substantive rights vindicated.29 Likewise, at the social level, accuracy

286-90. But, even if one accepts this proposition, these values are still linked to
participation. Id. at 289-90; see also Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights,
Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 passim (1993).
23 Solum, supra note 20, at 280.
24 See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 2021-22 (2007) [hereinafter Who Decides?] (teasing out how
these interests play out in aggregate litigation); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of
Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1391-92 (1991) (analyzing how this plays out
with public law remedies).
25 See Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to
Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 480-83 (2010) (citing to
an earlier Tyler study); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970);
Martin H. Redish, Procedural Due Process and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort
Litigation, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 18, 21 (1996) (explaining link between participation,
dignity, and legitimacy of judicial decision-making).
26 See Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 24, at 2022; Sturm, supra note 24, at 1392.
27 See Solum, supra note 20, at 306.
28 See John R. Allison, A Process Value Analysis of Decision-Maker Bias: The Case of
Economic Conflicts of Interest, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 481, 492-93 (1995); Cynthia R. Farina,
Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 226 (1991); see also United States
v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (“[A]rriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of
our legal system.”).
29 See Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the
Foundations of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV. 845, 852 (2012).
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matters because it helps effectuate the goals of substantive laws by
ensuring that they are appropriately applied.30
The efficiency norm has generally been construed as seeking to
optimally balance the aggregate costs against the overall litigation
benefits.31 Costs have largely been defined as the monetary
expenditures involved.32 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court focused
on the financial implications of potential discovery efforts in its
evaluations of the pleading issues raised in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.33 And the benefits have generally been
understood as the probative value of the information for proving the
case or how that information changes the expected value of the
claim.34 Some scholars, however, have argued for more expansive
understandings of costs and benefits, including social costs and nonpecuniary benefits.35
In part, these underlying norms are imbued with a quasiconstitutional dimension that demands attention be paid to the
document discovery procedural rules that are designed to effectuate
them.36 While this is not to say that there is a general constitutional
30 Id.; see also Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation
Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1162 (2006).
31 See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1797 (2015)
[hereinafter The Efficiency Norm]; Solum, supra note 20, at 275. There are, of course,
other definitions of efficiency. For example, Pareto efficiency states, “[a] legal rule is
efficient if it induces people to behave in such a way that no one can be made better
off (in terms of [his or] her own preferences) with-out making someone else worse
off.” Id. at 1796 (quoting Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic
Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 688-89 (1986)). And KaldorHicks efficiency is when the “aggregative benefits of an activity outweigh the
aggregative costs.” Id. (quoting Ora F. Harris, Jr., The Automobile Emissions Control
Inspection and Maintenance Program: Making It More Palatable to “Coerced”
Participants, 49 LA. L. REV. 1315, 1345 n.157 (1989)).
32 See Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, supra note 31, at 1797-1800 (discussing this
phenomena); see also Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV.
2073, 2073-74 (2002).
33 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686-87 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
34 See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Daniel Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal
Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 451 (1994); Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery
Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in
a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 914 (2009).
35 See, e.g., Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, supra note 31, at 1797-800.
36 See Vivian Grosswald Curran, United States Discovery and Foreign Blocking
Statutes, 76 LA. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (2016); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective
Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 464 (1991) [hereinafter
Confidentiality]; Imre Stephen Szalai, A Constitutional Right to Discovery? Creating and
Reinforcing Due Process Norms Through the Procedural Laboratory of Arbitration, 15
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right to discovery, both scholars and courts have recognized the link
between due process and discovery, noting that fundamental fairness
sometimes demands that a litigant be given access to certain
information that then allows the court to make an informed decision
on the merits of the claim.37 One example is when the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that a district court’s
denials of requests for a commission to take a foreign deposition left a
plaintiff unable to prove her case.38 The court held that “[d]ue process
mandates that a judicial proceeding give all parties an opportunity to
be heard on the critical and decisive allegations which go to the core
of the parties’ claim or defense and to present evidence on the
contested facts.”39
B. Short History of the Federal Document Discovery Rules
Four years after the passage of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the
first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) were adopted.40 The
original procedural rules promoted the resolution of cases on the
merits after robust fact-finding. In keeping with this goal and
expanding on the English tradition, the early rules permitted liberal
discovery.41 In particular, then — as now — Rules 26 through 37 dealt
with discovery.42
In both 1948 and 1970, these discovery rules were substantially
amended to adapt to the changing times and to respond to challenges

PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 337, 372-73 (2015).
37 See Curran, supra note 36; see also In re Extradition of Singh, 123 F.R.D. 108,
126 (D.N.J. 1987) (holding that “although a litigant has no general constitutional right
to discovery, there may be circumstances under which specific discovery must be
afforded as a matter of due process”); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 56 So. 3d 1283, 1287-88
(Miss. Ct. App. 2011); Jimenez v. Brooks, No. LLICV146011314S, 2016 WL 1443594,
at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2016).
38 Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 752 F.2d 874, 889 (3d Cir. 1984).
39 Id. at 890 (emphasis omitted).
40 Subrin & Main, The Fourth Era, supra note 9, at 1843.
41 See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of
the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 710, 716 (1998) [hereinafter
Fishing Expeditions] (describing the development of procedural rules over time); see
also 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2002 (3d ed.
2017); Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 282 (2009) [hereinafter Recovering Access]; Edson R.
Sunderland, An Inquiry Concerning the Functions of Procedure in Legal Education, 21
MICH. L. REV. 372, 381-82 (1923) [hereinafter Procedure in Legal Education].
42 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 41.
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learned through experience with the rules in practice.43 Of particular
importance for this Article, the 1970 amendment made Rule 26 the
basic rule governing the scope of all discovery.44
In a recent article, Professor Stephen Subrin and Professor Thomas
Main identified that federal civil procedure has entered a new era
which focuses on constrictive case management rather than full merits
determinations, using techniques like heightened pleading standards
and more liberal grants of summary judgment.45 Indirectly, these
practices impact discovery by curtailing cases before trial and, in the
case of the heightened pleading standards, before the discovery phase
at all.46 And even for the cases that survived to discovery, the
procedural rules governing document discovery have generally been
growing more restrictive since the 1980s.47 For example, in 1983, Rule
26’s language was changed to remove any suggestion that discovery
requests had no limitations.48 And, in 2000, the scope of discovery was
reduced from any matter “relevant to the subject matter involved in
the action” to those “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”49
Not all of the changes, however, have constricted discovery. For
example, in 1980, Rule 26 was amended to entitle counsel to the
assistance of the court in discovery planning.50 And, in 1993,
affirmative initial disclosures and pre-discovery planning conferences
were introduced.51

43

Id.
Id. § 2003.
45 Subrin & Main, The Fourth Era, supra note 9, at 1848-49.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1850 (citing Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil
Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative
Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1211-12 (2005); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529,
544 (2001)); see, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 41, § 2003.1 (describing 1983
amendments to Rule 26, charging courts to monitor overuse).
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment; see also
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 41, § 2003.1; Hiro N. Aragaki, Constructions of Arbitration’s
Informalism: Autonomy, Efficiency, and Justice, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 141, 157 n.112
(2016).
49 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment; Aragaki,
supra note 48.
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1980 amendment; Aragaki, supra
note 48.
51 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), (f) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment;
William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform,
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 721 (1989).
44
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Two modern changes are most salient to this Article’s focus on ESI.
First, in 2006, the term “electronically stored information” was added
to Rule 26, explicitly bringing in this type of material.52 Second, as
discussed in greater detail, in 2015, a direct proportionality limitation
to discovery was added to Rule 26.53
C. How the Procedural Justice Norms Are Embodied Within the
Document Discovery Rules
There is no easy way to measure the procedural justice norms as
they play out in the context of civil discovery54 and, thus, this
discussion starts by laying out some assumptions about how the
norms relate to the amount of information shared. Quantity is the
logical starting place because it is both the easiest characteristic to
identify and it goes to the general nature of most discovery disputes.
The majority of discovery disputes turn on whether a party has to
produce more information — whether through documents or a
deponent.55 And the parties often specify the amount of material at
issue in their briefing when there are disputes.56 Accordingly, even
when the quantity cannot be specified with exactness, both the parties
and the courts know that a ruling in a discovery dispute generally will
probably result in either more or less information.
But, before moving on to a deeper examination of how the quantity
of material correlates with the norms, this Article must acknowledge
that its general assumption that the quantity of material exchanged
positively correlates with the amount of salient information
exchanged, is ultimately just a convenient heuristic. Quantity is not
synonymous with quality.57 The relationship between quantity and
52

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
54 See, e.g., James S. Kakalik, Analyzing Discovery Management Policies: Rand Sheds
New Light on the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 1998 JUDGES’ J. 22, 27 n.3
(“We also had insufficient data to evaluate methods lawyers use to manage discovery
outside the court’s purview or to evaluate the quality and appropriateness of discovery
on the study cases.”).
55 See Paula Schaefer, Attorneys, Document Discovery, and Discipline, 30 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 8 (2017). There are, of course, the rare occasions in which a discovery
dispute goes to issues like the conditions under which certain material may be
examined.
56 See, e.g., PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV657, 2007 WL 2687670, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007).
57 See Betsy Barry et al., The Big ESI: Going from Big to Better in E-Discovery, 10 I/S:
J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 721, 721-22 (2015); see also In re Citric Acid Litig., 996 F.
Supp. 951, 956 (N.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d, 191 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Apparently
53
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quality is particularly variable in our digital world where it is easy to
generate a myriad of duplicates.58 Additionally, discovery processes
that encourage interactive participation of the parties — like early
disclosures and planning conferences — may improve accuracy even
though the quantity of shared material might decline.59 For example,
when litigants discuss the contours of the cases early, the exchanged
knowledge may permit the parties to better tailor their requests,
getting more salient information from a reduced volume.60 Such
participatory information exchanges also may reduce the cost side of
the ledger by discouraging motion practice over disputes.61
With those caveats, the Article now examines how the quantity of
documents or other information-containing material relates to the
three procedural justice norms, starting with accuracy. In the scholarly
literature and jurisprudence addressing discovery and evidence issues,
most scholars and courts assume a positive correlation between the
volume of material and accuracy.62 In part, this starts with an
underlying assumption that the amount of probative information

hoping that quantity will substitute for quality, plaintiffs have submitted voluminous
but weak circumstantial evidence that they argue indicates that Cargill was a member
of the conspiracy.”); M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Carestream Health, Inc., No.
CIV.A.07C-11-242, 2010 WL 1611042, at *63 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2010), aff’d
sub nom. Carestream Health, Inc. v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC, 9 A.3d 475 (Del. 2010)
(discussing Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 2010 WL 1335937, at *5-7 (S.D. Cal.
Apr. 2, 2010), wherein the court sanctioned Qualcomm for failing to timely produce
requested material based on the quality and content of the material, not just the
volume).
58 See Ronald J. Hedges, A View from the Bench and the Trenches: A Critical
Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227
F.R.D. 123, 123 (2005) (noting “[t]he sheer volume of e-information, which results
from the duplication of that information”); Hon. Craig B. Shaffer, The “Burdens” of
Applying Proportionality, 16 SEDONA CONF. J. 55, 61-62 (2015).
59 See Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery
Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2250-51 (2014).
60 Id.
61 Id. In the same vein, a shorter discovery period did not result in decreased
lawyer satisfaction, suggesting that it did not negatively impact the amount of
important information exchanged. See Daniel Klerman, The Economics of Civil
Procedure, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 353, 366 (2015) (describing study results).
62 See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 481, 498 (1994) (“Discovery adds to the accuracy of outcomes not only by
eliminating surprises about the evidence but also by expanding the quantity of
evidence.”); cf. Aviva Sports, Inc. v. Fingerhut Direct Mktg., Inc., Civ. No. 09-1091
(JNE/JSM), 2012 WL 12894846, at *3 (D. Minn. May 11, 2012) (describing a
production that turned discovery into “an exercise of looking for a needle in a
haystack”). But see Barry et al., supra note 57, at 721-22.
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correlates with volume.63 It further follows from the idea that accuracy
is best served when a decision-maker — such as a court — has perfect
information.64 Presumably, if a decision-maker had access to all of the
information-containing materials, it would have this perfect
information. And, while this is not feasible, the relationship between
the amount of material and important information still should hold.65
First, when a decision-maker has access to more material, there are
fewer opportunities for key information to remain concealed or
otherwise undisclosed.66 Second, the volume of information itself
might have some probative value, providing important context to the
more salient pieces of data.67
In litigation settings, the quantity of information available likewise
is generally assumed to promote the participation norm.68 First, “the
exchange of facts is both an expression of and a prerequisite for voice
and information gathering.”69 Second, robust discovery gives the
parties information about what is really at issue, enabling them to
better tailor their story to speak most directly to the legal question.70
63 See C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust
Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 49 (1999); Hay, supra note 62, at 497-98.
64 See Beckner & Salop, supra note 63, at 49.
65 See id.; see also Hay, supra note 62, at 498.
66 See Hay, supra note 62, at 497.
67 See id.; see also Peter M. Shane, Foreword: Big Data Future and the First Decade of
an Interdisciplinary Journal, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 671, 677-78 (2015).
68 See MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: ALLOCATING TO INDIVIDUALS 40
(1990) (“The common-law principle of an opportunity to be heard has typically been
taken to include rights . . . to pre-hearing discovery. . . .”); see, e.g., Susan G. Clark,
Judicial Review and the Admission of “Additional Evidence” Under the IDEIA: An Unusual
Mixture of Discretion and Deference, 201 Ed. L. Rep. 823, 825 (West) (Nov. 17, 2005)
(describing how the IDEIA disclosure requirements give parents the ability to
meaningfully participate in the adjudicative process).
69 Endo, supra note 2, at 831; see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology
of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 155 (2011)
(explaining that “[r]estrictive discovery rules” cause “individuals’ perceptions about
their opportunity for voice in litigation” to diminish). Even when courts deny
discovery requests, they frequently acknowledge that a certain amount of information
sharing is necessary to give litigants a voice in the proceedings. See, e.g., United States
v. Everglades Coll., Inc., 855 F.3d 1279, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v.
Ingrassia, No. CR-04-0455ADSJO, 2005 WL 2875220, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2005)
(“The [CVRA] no more requires disclosure of the pre-sentence report to meet its
remedial goal of giving crime victims a voice in sentencing than it does disclosure of
all discovery in a criminal case to promote the goal of giving victims a voice at plea
proceedings.”).
70 See Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion in Civil Cases:
Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 936-37 (2003); see also
Benham, supra note 59, at 2250-51.
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Third, promoting greater exchange of material can encourage the
parties to engage in more robust dialogue, rather than stonewalling.71
The quantity of material and economic efficiency has the most direct
relationship in document discovery.72 In most cases, the document
discovery production costs are positively correlated with the amount
of material and the probative value of additional information is likely
to decline at the margins.73 To illustrate the sorts of costs, in a class
action, a computer search resulted in 493 gigabytes of information,
which equaled about 15 million pages that would cost approximately
$10 million to produce.74 But, even here, the relationship is not
uniform, particularly in cases in which the main discovery costs of
producing certain types of ESI come from accessing older legacy
technologies.75
Given the above, this Article generally assumes that accuracy and
participation are enhanced while (economic) efficiency is harmed
when discovery processes provide for more, rather than less,
production of materials.76 And, with these assumptions, it is easy to
see how the procedural justice norms play out in document discovery
at a high level. Both reasoned decision-making by the court and a
meaningful voice by the parties rely on having sufficient information.77
As noted above, the discovery rules were promulgated to ensure that
each party — and, ultimately, the court — has the information
necessary to judge the case.78 At the same time, perfect accuracy and
participation may come at too great a cost.79 And, thus, processes that

71 See Erica G. Franklin, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process:
A Debate on the Merits of “Discovery” Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 587-88 (1999)
(describing this phenomenon in the criminal context).
72 See Beckner & Salop, supra note 63, at 49; John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better
Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 563 (2010);
Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 34, at 449. The concrete costs of electronic
production are further discussed in Part III.B.
73 See Geoffrey P. Miller, On the Costs of Civil Justice, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2115, 2118
(2002) [hereinafter On the Costs].
74 John B. v. Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787, 882 (M.D. Tenn. 2010).
75 See Moss, supra note 34, at 942.
76 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 873, 883-85 (2012) (describing the tensions surrounding a prosecutor’s
discovery obligations in the criminal context). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 1; Subrin,
Fishing Expeditions, supra note 41, at 716 (describing the early rationale behind
expanded discovery).
77 See Beckner & Salop, supra note 63, at 49.
78 See supra Part II.B.
79 See Miller, On the Costs, supra note 73, at 2118; Solum, supra note 20, at 185.
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consider costs bring in the efficiency norm to protect the system from
toppling under its own weight.
Looking more closely at particular rules, Rule 1 of the F.R.C.P states
the code’s broad purpose is “to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”80 This
“controlling” rule provides a lens through which to interpret the other
rules.81 And, in the context of discovery, Rule 1 itself encourages the
exchange of information necessary for the parties to present their
claims or defenses, prevent unfair surprises, and to avoid
unnecessarily long processes.82 Moreover, the primary position of the
term “just” implies a concern that goes beyond the tactical elements of
winning a case. This broader reading is consistent with the history of
the procedural rules, which privileged giving parties a chance to be
heard.83
Rule 26 and Rule 34 directly govern document discovery. Rule
26(b)(1)’s definition of the scope of discovery, as amended in 2015,
reads as follows:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery
is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount
in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant
information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

80

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
See Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Managing Summary Judgment, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 517, 519-20 (2012). See generally Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A
Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287 (2010) (describing how Rule
1 can affect the way other Rules are interpreted and applied).
82 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (describing the goal as
“adequately informing the litigants in civil trials”); JAY E. GRENIG & JEFFREY S. KINSLER,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE § 9:2 (3d ed. 2010); John S.
Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 534-35
(2000); Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 41, at 716.
83 See Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, supra note 31, at 1811-12; Coleman,
Recovering Access, supra note 41, at 282; Edson R. Sunderland, Procedure in Legal
Education, supra note 41, at 381-82. See generally Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra
note 41, at 710, 716 (describing the history of the procedural rules).
81
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Information within this scope of discovery need not be
admissible in evidence to be discoverable.84
The new text of Rule 26(b)(1) directly embeds a proportionality
requirement into the definition of the scope of discovery. The factors
that go into the proportionality requirement include cost. And the
standard reading of the revised rule is that the proportionality
requirement then turns into a question of economic efficiency.85
Likewise, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) explicitly states that a party does not
have to “provide discovery of electronically stored information from
sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of
undue burden or cost” unless a court orders the production based on a
finding of good cause.86 This balancing again goes to a notion of
efficiency.
Rule 26(f) requires the parties to confer at least twenty-one days
before a scheduling conference is to be held or a scheduling order is
due.87 At the discovery conference, the parties are directed to:
[C]onsider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses
and the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the case;
make or arrange for the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1);
discuss any issues about preserving discoverable information;
and develop a proposed discovery plan.88
Given the required dialogue, the conference is an opportunity for
party participation.89 And the initial disclosures are understood to
increase the overall procedural fairness and the fairness of the
outcome.90
Rule 34 lays out the process for requests, productions, and
objections.91 This rule’s main limitation on requests stems from its
84

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
Endo, supra note 2, at 828; see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Electronic Agency
and the Traditional Paradigms of Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 89 (1992).
86 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
87 Id. 26(f)(1).
88 Id. 26(f)(2).
89 See The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Protection of Privileged ESI, 17
SEDONA CONF. J. 95, 168 (2016) (explaining that lawyers must be prepared to discuss
and explain their choices related to ESI production). See generally Allen & Jehl, supra
note 70, at 936-37 (explaining that parties divulge their factual and legal theories
through discovery); Benham, supra note 59, at 2250-51 (explaining the benefits of
discovery sharing).
90 Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 535 (1998).
91 FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
85
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reference to Rule 26(b)(1), which defines the scope of discovery.92
Rule 34 further requires that requests describe sought items with
reasonable particularity.93 It also provides a mechanism for objecting
to requests.94 In sum, Rule 34 dictates how parties exchange
documents and information about the exchanges. This is especially
true after the 2015 amendments, which required that any objections to
document requests be stated with specificity.95 With its focus on
information-sharing, Rule 34 appears to primarily serve the accuracy
and participation norms.
One additional wrinkle when considering how the norms are
operationalized in the document discovery rules is that lawyers —
rather than parties — tend to be the main players in the processes.96
At the same time, lawyers are dependent on their clients for directions
and much of the sought-after information. And sometimes clients may
wish to hide information or otherwise act in a recalcitrant way.97
II.

SYSTEMIC PRESSURES ACTING ON DISCOVERY

An understanding of the impetus for reform efforts provides
meaningful context for evaluating their intended or likely effects. To
put it another way, if one is going to assess a solution, one must first
know the problem. And, as Judge Diane Wood of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained while serving as the liaison
for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, calls for discovery reform
in the federal system come from a variety of sources, such as
congressional acts, Supreme Court decisions, input from judges,
academic research, and lessons drawn from other jurisdictions’
practices.98 But, whatever the source, the general concern animating
92

See id. 34(a).
Id. 34(b)(1)(A).
94 See id. 34(b)(2).
95 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B); id. advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendment;
Amii N. Castle, A Comprehensive Overview: 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 837, 855 (2016).
96 See Sturm, supra note 24, 1392 (“Lawyers possess the expertise in the technical
rules necessary to conduct discovery, frame legal arguments, and narrow the issues
before the court.”).
97 See Willging et al., supra note 90, at 541 (noting that some lawyers identified
clients as the source of discovery issues); see also Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and
Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 741 (1987); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the “Haves”
a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 264-65
(1999).
98 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA BOOK 71 (Apr. 10–11, 2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15486.
93
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document discovery reform efforts is outsized costs.99 While this
widely held perception about the prevalence of problematic discovery
costs is strongly contested, there are two pressures — finite litigation
resources and the expanding universe of ESI — whose confluence is
likely to place increasing pressure on the current document discovery
system.
A. Finite Litigation Resources
1.

Judicial Resources

Since discovery is meant to be managed by the parties, the process
has been thought to pose practically no burden on the judiciary.100 But
concern over finite judicial resources may still drive reform efforts
because it theoretically could lead to an overtaxed judiciary and costly
delays for the parties, particularly given judges’ enhanced managerial
role over discovery and their own perceptions of burden.101
As seen in the several amendments to the F.R.C.P., there is a
structural push towards more judicial management of discovery.102
99 See, e.g., David A. Green, The Fallacy of Liberal Discovery: Litigating Employment
Discrimination Cases in the E-Discovery Age, 44 CAP. U. L. REV. 693, 711 (2016) (“On
April 29, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States approved sweeping changes to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that will affect e-discovery. The changes were
driven, in large part, by the enormous cost associated with discovery, and more
specifically, with e-discovery.”). But see Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff
Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant
Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1112-13
(2015) [hereinafter Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments]; Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in
Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for
Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1432 (1994) [hereinafter Discovery in
Disarray]; Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 683 (1998); Danya Shocair Reda, The
Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L.
REV. 1085, 1086 (2012).
100 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules:
Comment on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 659 (1994) (“Discovery is party-initiated
and largely party-controlled. It requires no expenditure of judicial resources except
when discovery disputes are brought to the court for resolution.”).
101 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 380 (1982).
102 See Kenneth J. Withers, E-Discovery and Combative Legal Culture: Finding a Way
Out of Purgatory, 2009 ANN. AAJ-PAPERS 5 (2009). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)
advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendment (“The present amendment again
reflects the need for continuing and close judicial involvement in the cases that do not
yield readily to the ideal of effective party management.”). And, more generally, the
move to a more managerial role for judges has been broadly accepted in the academic
literature for some time. See, e.g., Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught
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For example, starting in 1980 with the addition of subdivision (f) to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, courts could be brought into
discovery planning.103 Several years later, the power to affirmatively
manage discovery processes — including the use of sanctions — was
given to judges.104 Most recently, going directly to limiting costs, a
direct proportionality limitation to discovery was added to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26 in 2015.105
Even with the enhanced role of judges, it is unclear that limited
judicial resources should be driving document discovery reform
efforts. First, federal judges do not appear overly taxed by document
discovery in civil litigation.106 Additionally, magistrate judges may
help alleviate any pressure on the Article III judges.107 As to the impact
of finite judicial resources on the parties, an examination of judges’
docket reports shows that “extensive discovery involved” is rarely a
significant cause for case delays.108 Despite this data, judges
subjectively perceive document discovery as creating a significant drag
in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 670-71 (2010); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal
Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 770, 770 (1981); Resnik, supra note 101, at 380.
103 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), (g) advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendment
(noting that “[i]n an appropriate case the court could restrict the number of
depositions, interrogatories, or the scope of a production request”).
104 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendment
(noting that “encouraging the imposition of sanctions” helps provide “a deterrent to
both excessive discovery and evasion”); Aragaki, supra note 48, at 157 n.112 (2016).
105 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendment.
106 See Moore, Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments, supra note 99, at 1133-34; see
also Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District Courts,
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2015). But see Beckerman, supra note 82, at 508
(noting increase in discovery disputes and written orders addressing them). To make
this more concrete, one estimate suggests that judges only spend about fifteen minutes
dealing with discovery in civil rights-employment cases that last a bit over twelve
hours in total. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003–2004 DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING
STUDY APPENDIX Y: FINAL WEIGHTS MATERIAL PRESENTED TO THE STATISTICS
SUBCOMMITTEE 9 (2005), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CaseWtsY.pdf.
107 Judge Grimm’s survey found that eighty-one percent of the district judges refer
discovery disputes to magistrate judges for resolution at least some of the time. See
Hon. Paul W. Grimm, Are We Insane? The Quest for Proportionality in the Discovery
Rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 REV. LITIG. 117, 135 (2017); see also
Alexander, supra note 100, at 659 (“[D]iscovery disputes are commonly referred to a
magistrate judge, relieving the district judge of the necessity of hearing them.”). But
see T. Michael Putnam, The Utilization of Judges in the Federal District Courts of
Alabama, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 635, 644-45 (1998) (noting that when the author became a
magistrate judge in 1987, over ninety percent of his time was devoted to prisoner
litigation and that magistrate judges now take on a wider range of matters).
108 Moore, Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments, supra note 99, at 1138.
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on their time, which might fuel the existing narrative about how
document discovery is over-consuming finite judicial resources.109
2.

Litigant Resources/Lawyer-Hours

While there is little empirical data about what drives lawyers’
choices in their discovery practices,110 there are several trends that
explain the common conception that discovery costs must be
constrained, namely the general economic pressures on the legal
profession and the commodification of tasks like discovery due to
alternative staffing decisions and technological tools.111
The 2008 recession placed cost-pressures on law firms as the
financial markets shuddered, leading institutional clients to demand
discounts and introducing fixed-fee engagements.112 As fees go down,
discovery may become seen as an expense that must be borne by the
attorney and, accordingly, deemphasized.113 Similarly, billing hourly is
correlated with spending more time on discovery so its decline
suggests less lawyer-time devoted to discovery.114
In response to these economic pressures, some law firms also have
introduced alternative staffing practices, including the use of contract

109 See, e.g., Richard J. Corbett & Virginia R. Llewellyn, The Next Discovery
Frontier: Preparing for Backup Data Requests, 21 ACCA DOCKET 116, 128 (2003).
110 See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil
Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 803 (1998) (“Much of the literature on incentives
affecting discovery practice is rooted in economic theory. Yet, there is little
information about how lawyers actually make discovery decisions.”).
111 See Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer’s Monopoly — What Goes and What Stays,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3067, 3068 (2014) (“[T]he market for legal services is changing
radically, and the portion of the market reserved for lawyers is shrinking . . . .”);
Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the
Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2011);
Nathaniel Vargas Gallegos, The Solo Lawyer Proportion: Explanations with the “Push &
Pull” Factors Endemic in Legal Firm Organization, 37 J. LEGAL PROF. 25, 49-50 (2012).
One can see large firms, like Paul Hastings LLP, offering fee arrangements other than
hourly billing such as fixed-fee engagements in which the client pays a set amount for
a specific task. See Alternative Fee Arrangements, PAUL HASTINGS (2017),
https://www.paulhastings.com/area/litigation/alternative-fee-arrangements.
112 See Ronald W. Staudt & Andrew P. Medeiros, Access to Justice and Technology
Clinics: A 4% Solution, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 695, 695-96 (2013).
113 See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES:
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 6 (2010) (explaining how lawyers working on contingency do
less discovery).
114 See id. (reporting to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules); see also George Shepherd, Failed Experiment: Twombly, Iqbal, and Why Broad
Pretrial Discovery Should Be Further Eliminated, 49 IND. L. REV. 465, 468 (2016).
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attorneys and outsourcing.115 The movement from using full-cost
associates to lower-cost internal staff or outside agents altogether
demonstrates the commodification of this aspect of practice.
Similarly, lawyers have adopted technological tools like predictive
coding to help deal with the volume of discovery.116 The introduction
of automated tools further calls into question what clients view as a
lawyer’s work for which they are willing to pay.117
Given these combined economic pressures on discovery practice,
concerns related to finite litigant resources — from both the
standpoint of clients and lawyers — likely are a chief driver of reform
efforts.
B. “Infinite” ESI
The key aspect of ESI is its quantity.118 As computers of all types —
from smartphones to laptops — abound, people are constantly
generating an immense amount of digital data.119 According to
discovery expert Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck: “The amount of
digital information that is created every day is staggering, and many
companies preserve almost everything.” 120
Within the next five years, it is estimated that the world will have
produced 44 zettabytes (44 trillion gigabytes) of data.121 And each
gigabyte can equal tens of thousands of printed pages.122 If each
115 See Burk & McGowan, supra note 111, at 82; Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big
Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 766 (2010).
116 See Burk & McGowan, supra note 111, at 81-82; Daniel Martin Katz,
Quantitative Legal Prediction — or — How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start
Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909,
910-12 (2013).
117 See Katz, supra note 116, at 910-12.
118 This is, of course, not the only way in which ESI differs from paper information.
ESI also frequently has many more sources and forms that might depend on the
system that created it; it can be dynamic, which creates preservation issues; it may
contain metadata or other less obvious information; and deleting data does not always
actually destroy the data. See RONALD J. HEDGES ET AL., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION 3 (3d ed. 2017), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/
2017/Managing_Discovery_of_Electronic_Information_3d_ed.pdf.
119 See Withers, December 2006 Amendments, supra note 11, at 174; see also Barry et
al., supra note 57, at 723 (“Simply put, the information artifacts of our personal and
professional lives are now mostly digital . . . .”).
120 Peck, supra note 2, at 3.
121 The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data and the Increasing Value of the
Internet of Things, Executive Summary, IDC (Apr. 2014), http://www.emc.com/
leadership/digital-universe/2014iview/executive-summary.htm.
122 Joshua M. Hummel, What’s in the Future for E-Discovery? New Federal Rules and
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gigabyte of the 44 zettabytes only corresponded to a single printed
page, the number of pages would still be greater than the number of
grains of sand in the world.123
This volume may have profound cost implications in civil discovery.
In a 2012 study, production costs on a per gigabyte basis averaged
around $18,000.124 And the aggregate costs of e-discovery continue to
rise from $2 billion in 2006 to almost $3 billion in 2009.125 Given
these figures, it is easy to understand why concerns about cost drive
many recent document discovery reform efforts.
C. Document Discovery Abuse & ESI
The perception that excessive document discovery commonly leads
to expensive and lengthy litigation processes is widespread with highprofile commentators like then-Vice President Dan Quayle and current
Chief Justice John Roberts calling for reform.126 This “cost-and-delay”
narrative featured prominently in the 2015 amendment process.127 In
support of this position, proponents of reform can point to several
studies that show lawyers’ dissatisfaction with document discovery.
For example, a study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”)
found that about twenty-five percent of lawyers think discovery is
disproportional.128 Likewise, a report prepared for the Conference on
Civil Litigation at the Duke University School of Law — a primary
Big Data Will Require Consideration in the Face of Continued Uncertainty, LAW PRAC.,
Mar.–Apr. 2015, at 52, 56.
123 See Robert Krulwich, Which Is Greater, the Number of Sand Grains on Earth or
Stars in the Sky?, NPR (Sept. 17, 2012, 10:19 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
krulwich/2012/09/17/161096233/which-is-greater-the-number-of-sand-grains-on-earthor-stars-in-the-sky.
124 NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, WHERE THE MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING
LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 20 (2012),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1208.pdf.
125 John T. Yip, Comment, Addressing the Costs and Comity Concerns of
International E-Discovery, 87 WASH. L. REV. 595, 595-96 (2012).
126 See Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure After the 2015
Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 3-4 (2016) (describing belief that document discovery
frequently leads to excessive costs and delays); see also EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E.
WILLGING, ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2
(2010) [hereinafter ATTORNEY SATISFACTION].
127 Steinman, supra note 126, at 4 discussing 2015 amendments); Reda, supra note
99, at 1086 (identifying — and coining the term for — the “cost-and-delay
narrative”).
128 See Suja A. Thomas & Dawson Price, How Atypical Cases Make Bad Rules: A
Commentary on the Rulemaking Process, 15 NEV. L.J. 1141, 1149 (2015) (discussing
report results).
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driver of the 2015 amendments — contended that disproportionate
e-discovery was a major issue.129
But the empirical case about excessive, disproportionate discovery
costs is highly contested.130 A RAND report concluded that
“[e]mpirical research has not produced evidence of widespread abuse
of discovery.”131 Even the FJC report showed that a significant
majority of lawyers thought that discovery was proportional in most
cases.132 Moreover, surveys about dissatisfaction or belief in the
prevalence of disproportionate discovery do not prove that it actually
is a common issue.133 Moreover, a recent study showed that judges
and lawyers do not privilege quick and inexpensive litigation
processes above other procedural values like truth-seeking.134
Further complicating the cost-and-delay narrative, it appears that
only a relatively small number of cases — perhaps ten percent of total
cases — involve expensive discovery.135 And these cases tend to be
complex litigation actions, which also frequently have high stakes.136
To make this more concrete, the FJC study acknowledged that not
every case involved discovery — the median total discovery cost in
cases that involved discovery was $15,000, and only in the top five
percent were costs much higher, approaching $1 million for

129 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & THE COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 3 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/
records-and-archives-rules-committees/special-projects-rules-committees/2010-civil.
130 See Beckerman, supra note 82, at 534-35; LEE & WILLGING, ATTORNEY
SATISFACTION, supra note 126, at 1 (“The statement, ‘Discovery is abused in almost
every case,’ elicited more disagreement than agreement from the ACTL fellows and
ABA Section plaintiff attorneys, and more agreement than disagreement from NELA
members and other ABA Section members.”).
131 JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT:
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA xv (1998),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR941.html.
132 See Thomas & Price, supra note 128, at 1149.
133 See Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra note 99, at 1405-06 (describing
additional methodological flaws of older surveys).
134 Roger Michalski, The Clash of Procedural Values, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 62,
96 (2018).
135 See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, Braking the Rules: Why State Courts
Should Not Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 501, 520 (2016) [hereinafter Braking the Rules].
136 See id.

2019]

Discovery Hydraulics

1341

defendants.137 Accordingly, the one-size-fits-all worries about cost are
inapposite.138
Just as surveys about discovery dissatisfaction do not definitively
confirm the existence of a problem, the conjunction of both finite
litigation resources and a virtually infinite universe of ESI does not
necessarily mean that there is a great risk of document discovery
abuse. Concerns about the overuse or misuse of document discovery
long predate the digital age.139 And, there is good reason to think that
dissatisfaction will continue.140
But ESI is different. First and most fundamentally, as discussed
above, the volume of ESI is unprecedented.141 And part of that volume
is because the nature of ESI lends itself to the creation of more
material because it is easy to: generate, create variations, duplicate,
and store.142 Additionally, ESI comes with metadata, which both adds
to the volume and may require costly expertise to interpret.143 Finally,
ESI can be stored on legacy systems that can contribute further to the
cost.144
D. Future-Proofing
While document discovery does not clearly present widespread costefficiency issues now, one could imagine how the confluence of finite
litigation resources and a virtually infinite amount of discoverable
material could lead to those problems. To concretize this, imagine a
low-level office employee bringing an individual race discrimination
suit against his or her employer after being denied a promotion. The
monetary stakes might be fairly low — a study of New York City
employment discrimination awards showed an average award of about

137 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & THE COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 129, at 3.
138 See Subrin & Main, Braking the Rules, supra note 135, at 520.
139 See supra Part II.B.
140 See generally Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of
Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 765-66 (2010) [hereinafter Defining
the Problem] (“We begin with a prediction: At some point in the relatively near future,
the 2010 Civil Litigation Review Conference (Duke Conference) will be labeled a
failure.”).
141 See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 3 (The Sedona Conference Working
Grp. ed., 2d ed. 2007).
142 Id. at 3-5.
143 Id. at 3, 5-7.
144 See id. at 3.
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$90,000145 — and the discovery costs could be high if the information
that might show a discriminatory intent might be found in a large
number of emails and human resources documents that are dispersed
across the company.146 For example, the average corporate worker
sends or receives more than 100 emails per day,147 which means three
supervisors’ emails alone create a world of more than 100,000
documents over a year. If the relevant time period was five years, this
implies a minimum discovery production cost of $90,000 — the same
amount as the average award.148
Moreover, as Judge Wood pointed out to the Civil Rules Committee,
some sorts of problems may change more quickly than the rulemaking
process can address them.149 The growth of ESI appears to present
exactly that challenge. The technological elements — both in its
creation and in its use in judicial proceedings — are in constant flux,
creating a risk of rule obsolescence.150 Accordingly, to avoid being
merely a stop-gap measure, document discovery reform efforts should
be designed to address likely future conditions. This practice of futureproofing — that is, crafting law to remain applicable despite potential
changes in outside conditions over time — contributes to stability in
the procedural rules and doctrines that lends itself to a more uniform
and certain system.151 The taxonomy presented below should help
make these assessments.

145 D. Hardison Wood & David Mark Leon, Measuring Value in Mediation: A Case
Study of Workplace Mediation in City Government, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 383,
396 (2006) (noting that New York City paid about $90,000 per claim on average for
employment discrimination verdicts).
146 See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 507, 545 (2011); Hay, supra note 62, at 483-84.
147 Harrison M. Brown, Comment, Searching for an Answer: Defensible E-Discovery
Search Techniques in the Absence of Judicial Voice, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 407, 411 (2013).
148 See PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 124, at 20 (giving cost of producing one gigabyte
as $18,000); LEXIS-NEXIS, HOW MANY PAGES IN A GIGABYTE, https://www.
lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADI_FS_PagesInAGigabyte.pdf
(last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (estimating 100,000 email pages per gigabyte).
149 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 71 (Apr. 10-11, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15486.
150 See id.; see also Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act,
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214 (2004).
151 See Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 24, 38-39 (2012). One example where a concern about future-proofing
has already played out is in expert handwriting analyses after Daubert. See D. Michael
Risinger, Cases Involving the Reliability of Handwriting Identification Expertise Since the
Decision in Daubert, 43 TULSA L. REV. 477, 526-27 (2007).
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III. TAXONOMY OF CURRENT AND PROPOSED DOCUMENT DISCOVERY
REFORMS
One way to make sense of the myriad of proposed and implemented
document discovery reforms is to undertake a purposive inquiry that
asks whether the changes will effectuate the procedural justice norms
— accuracy, efficiency, and participation — that appear in Mathews
and undergird the entire system of civil procedure.152 But the interplay
of finite litigation resources and effectively infinite discoverable
material means that any reform will have to make tough normative
tradeoffs amongst that set. And any choice, given how different groups
— such as judges, lawyers, for-profit corporate litigants, individual
litigants, and so forth — rank these norms, will ultimately be a choice
about which groups benefit.153
Whether due to capture by powerful interest groups or other factors,
most recent reforms have privileged a narrow conception of efficiency
that focuses on reducing the costs of discovery.154 But this elevation of
cost efficiency should not be a foregone conclusion. An increasingly
large group of academics, practitioners, and judges are exploring
techniques that consider more than just reducing the volume of
discovery to cut costs.155 The following taxonomy looks at a sample of
recently proposed and implemented reforms since 2006 (the formal
integration of ESI into the F.R.C.P.), connecting the reforms’
treatment of cost and volume of information with the three procedural
justice norms.
At the outset, any taxonomy of contemporary efforts to reform
document discovery must include its treatment of costs as a primary
characteristic. Over the past forty years, virtually all procedural
developments have tried to reduce the burden of discovery with a
particular concern about the financial costs.156 This follows from
common conceptions of discovery abuse that turns on whether the

152 See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 10, at 2194; see also Coleman, Civil-Izing
Federalism, supra note 10, at 310 (applying purposive approach more broadly to
recent developments in civil procedure).
153 Michalski, supra note 134, at 69.
154 See generally Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005
(2016). This is discussed in additional detail below.
155 See id. at 1063-71 (describing a technique that involves, for example, altering
the structure of institutions that design and promulgate procedure); see also Moore,
Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments, supra note 99, at 1111-13; Steinman, supra note
126, at 3-4.
156 See supra Part II.B.
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cost of complying with a request exceeds the value added to the
requesting party’s claim.157
This definition is not uncontested and, in application, is quickly
complicated. As Professor Stephen Burbank remarked, “Everyone
admits that there has been abuse of the litigation process in federal
courts, but in a formless system, abuse may be in the eye of the
beholder.”158 Nonetheless, whatever the normative weight or potential
practical ambiguities, as a descriptive matter, variants on this
economic cost-benefit approach predominate in the academic
literature and the discussions by rule-makers.159
Given this context, it is no surprise that the majority of current and
proposed reforms try to lower the costs of discovery, usually focusing
on the costs incurred by the responding party. Still, a minority
approach shifts the costs between the parties. And still, others seek to
privilege substantive equality or other non-pecuniary values over
financial costs.
The second characteristic of recent reform efforts is the amount of
information drawn into discovery. As discussed above in Section III,
the amount of discoverable material has grown exponentially in recent
years, leaving traditional lawyering methods unable to keep up. And,
thus, the treatment of this new universe of discoverable material is
another significant element of document discovery reforms. Many of
the most publicized reforms have reduced by costs by limiting
discover — that is, lowering the amount of information that comes
into the process. Others use technological or tactical innovations to
deal with the new volume of information.
From these two factors, as laid out below in Section IV(A)-(C), most
recent proposed and implemented reforms fall into three main groups:
(A) cost-reducing and information-reducing/information-neutral; (B)
cost-reducing and information-neutral/information-positive, and; (C)
cost-shifting and information-reducing.
As explained in Section II(C), cost and volume of information act as
rough proxies for procedural justice norms. Cost reduction goes to the

157 See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 34, at 450; see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637-38 (1989).
158 Stephen B. Burbank, Complex Litigation: Cases and Materials on Advanced Civil
Procedure, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1478 (1987) (book review).
159 See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 362 (D. Md.
2008); Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules
of Practice & Procedure, to Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure (June 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/st09-2014-add_0.pdf; Moss, supra note 34, at 910.
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dominant conception of efficiency while volume of information goes
to accuracy and participation. And, again, while these relationships are
not absolute, they are easy, logical heuristics that permit ex ante
normative evaluations of proposed reforms.
A. Cost-Reducing and Information-Reducing/Information-Neutral
The ascendant set of reforms establishes standardized limits to
document discovery requests or productions. In their most extreme
form, these reforms simply restrict the scope or amount of discovery
for all cases.160 Capturing the sentiment behind such reforms, Judge
Jon O. Newman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
once said, “I doubt that discovery should be routinely permitted.
Where discovery is needed, I doubt that depositions should be
permitted beyond two or three, limited to one hour, that
interrogatories should be permitted beyond five or ten, and that any
but precisely identified documents need be searched for and
produced.”161
One significant example of a cost-focused universal limit is the 2015
amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), which
integrated a requirement that discovery be “proportional to the needs
of the case” directly into the definition of its scope.162 One of the listed
factors that go into the proportionality inquiry is financial cost.163
The impact of the amendment has yet to be seen.164 And some
scholars argue that the amendment did not actually change the
standard as the proportionality requirement already existed in the
F.R.C.P.165 But there are others who construed it as a mechanism for
160

See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 114, at 468.
Jon O. Newman, Comment, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation
Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1650-51 (1985).
162 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 2015
amendment.
163 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
164 It is still early for empirical research to come out. Moreover, changes frequently
do not immediately shift actual practice. See generally Beisner, supra note 72, at 578
(describing how the 2000 amendments, like their predecessors, failed to have much
impact on judges’ approaches to discovery abuse). But, at least one expert has not seen
any real impact. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, Application of the New
“Proportionality” Discovery Rule in Class Actions: Much Ado About Nothing, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 1949 (2018).
165 See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 126, at 4; see also William H. J. Hubbard, Testing
for Change in Procedural Standards, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J.
LEGAL STUD. 35, 43 (2013) (noting disagreement about whether Twombly marked a
significant change and finding no change in procedural standards).
161
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reducing costs even at the risk of potentially screening out important
information. For example, in his 2015 year-end remarks, Chief Justice
Roberts seemed to ratify the notion that the reforms were necessary
because “in many cases civil litigation has become too expensive,
time-consuming, and contentious, inhibiting effective access to the
courts.”166 And this focus on reducing costs without regard to the
information lost is further evidenced by the interests groups —
primarily, large corporations that are frequently defendants in civil
actions and which perceive themselves as facing disproportionate ediscovery costs — who lobbied for its passage.167
Other more mechanical universal bright-line limits have been
adopted. For example, Arizona presumptively limits document
discovery requests in civil cases to ten items or distinct categories of
items.168
Utah has a more complex scheme that, absent a showing of a need
for “extraordinary discovery,” limits requests for production based on
the amount of alleged damages.169 In a case with damages of $50,000
or less, each side may only make five requests for production.170 For
cases involving damages between $50,000 and $300,000 or nonmonetary relief, each side is permitted ten requests for production.171
And in cases with damages of more than $300,000, each side is
permitted twenty.172 Amendments to Federal Rule of Procedure 26
based on the Utah system have been proposed.173
Another bright-line limit involves the use of mandatory stays.
Specifically identifying the costs of e-discovery, one professor has

166 Victor D. Quintanilla, Human-Centered Civil Justice Design, 121 PENN ST. L. REV.
745, 783-84 (2017) [hereinafter Human-Centered] (quoting CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G.
ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, U.S. SUPREME COURT 4
(2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf).
167 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and
Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1592 (2015) (citing
Memorandum from Robert S. Campbell, Jr., to the Members of the Fed. Civil
Procedure Comm., Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers 1, 3 (Sept. 16, 1999)); Stempel, supra
note 47, at 610-11.
168 ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 34; see also Quintanilla, Human-Centered, supra note 166, at 781
(discussing advocacy groups’ reliance on Arizona’s scheme for federal proposals).
169 UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(c).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Philip J. Favro & Hon. Derek P. Pullan, New Utah Rule 26: A Blueprint for
Proportionality Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 933,
977-79 (2012).
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proposed a mandatory discovery stay during the pendency of a motion
to dismiss in civil cases.174
One variation on these various limits to the amount of discovery is
to apply them only in certain types of cases or categories of
information. For example, as a default, the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act stays discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending in
securities litigation.175 Likewise, the Federal Circuit has issued a
Model Order that streamlines discovery, limiting email production in
particular.176 And some commentators have proposed introducing
mandatory delays in that context.177 Another proposed reform would
limit the production of data related to the Internet of Things.178
The 2015 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)
explicitly gave judges the authority, on their own motion, to limit the
amount of document discovery in specific cases — a more ad hoc
version of the categorical limits discussed above — if proportionality
concerns so require.179 Some ways courts do this is by imposing time
or money limits on the efforts of producing parties.180 For example, in
a wrongful termination suit, a judge ordered that the defendant only
had to spend up to forty hours searching for the requested
documents.181 At least one judge on the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York has broadened this to a set of
categorical limits on e-discovery, presumptively keeping it to ten key

174 Gideon Mark, Federal Discovery Stays, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 405, 408
(2012).
175 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B)
(2018); Mark, supra note 174, at 408. Another example is the staying of discovery in
qualified immunity cases while the threshold question as to whether the alleged
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known is considered. See Kevin J. Lynch, When
Staying Discovery Stays Justice: Analyzing Motions to Stay Discovery When a Motion to
Dismiss Is Pending, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 77 (2012) (discussing Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
176 E-DISCOVERY MODEL ORDER 2 (FED. CIRCUIT ADVISORY COUNCIL 2011),
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/announcements/Ediscovery_Model_
Order.pdf; see also Lance Shapiro, E-Discovery: Bargaining Bytes for Settlement, 27 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 887, 894 (2014).
177 See, e.g., Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at
Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2017).
178 See J. Travis Laster, A Milder Prescription for the Peppercorn Settlement Problem in
Merger Litigation, 93 TEX. L. REV. 129, 152-58 (2015).
179 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
180 See Grimm, supra note 107, at 171-72.
181 Marens v. Carrabba’s Italian Grill, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 35, 39 (D. Md. 2000).
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custodians, material created within the five years before lawsuit, and a
total of 160 hours in attorney-time.182
B. Cost-Reducing and Information-Neutral/Information-Positive
A second set of reforms designed to reduce the costs associated with
the effectively infinite amount of potentially discoverable material tries
to do so without losing the related information benefits — which
presumably also correlate with the accuracy and participation norms
— related to the volume. These reforms use tactical or technological
innovations, like sampling and predictive coding, appearing to have
developed organically in the judicial system in response to both the
2015 amendments and the underlying pressures that led to those rule
changes.183
1.

Sampling and Phasing

Eschewing the hard limits described above, some courts have
experimented with sampling and phasing. These techniques both permit
courts to manage costs by starting with some pool of information and
then making informed judgments based on that initial set.
Sampling is when the producing party only searches a designated
portion of the discoverable material.184 Then, if the results contain a
significant amount of responsive documents, the rest of the
discoverable material might be searched. For example, in a case
involving an allegedly anticompetitive pricing scheme, the district
court ordered that discovery begin by looking for material from only a
subset of the potential custodians.185 The parties were also given
permission to come back to the court after they analyzed the results of

182 HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, INDIVIDUAL RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR CIVIL CASES 45 (2015), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=judge_info&id=1166.
183 See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2001); see also Grimm,
supra note 107, at 134-41 (describing results from survey of judges about techniques
used to manage costs of discovery); Favro & Pullan, supra note 173, at 953
(discussing sampling). As Chief Justice Roberts described in his year-end speech, the
2015 amendments were, in part, designed to “engage judges in early and active case
management,” and that appears to be a trend. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, Jr., 2015
YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, U.S. SUPREME COURT 5 (2015),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf.
184 See, e.g., McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 33-35.
185 See Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL
4498465, at *16-17 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012).
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the initial samples.186 Another variation is when the initial sample is
taken as representative of the remaining body. For example, in a class
action dispute, a court ordered that a twenty percent sample of records
was sufficient for the parties to present arguments as to whether the
defendant’s challenged practices and policies were common across the
class.187
Similar to the first use of sampling, other proposals call for phasing
discovery, including mandatory phasing for all cases.188 Discretionary
phasing already is a common practice and might involve initially
limiting discovery to certain subject areas, time periods, or custodians
who are most likely to have relevant information.189 And, even before
the volume of ESI became a pressing discovery issue, courts routinely
phased discovery in cases involving a gated inquiry as seen with
Monell claims or class certification.190
The proportionality pressures of ESI, however, have led to calls for
mandatory phasing.191 Judge Paul Grimm, who sits on the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland, notably had a standing order in
which parties were required to start with only “the facts that are most
important to resolving the case, whether by trial, settlement or
dispositive motion.”192 Similar considerations have made it into other
local rules such as those for the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania.193 This can benefit the requesting party by

186

See id.
Quintana v. Claire’s Boutiques, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-00368-PSG, 2014 WL
234219, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014).
188 See, e.g., Michael Thomas Murphy, Occam’s Phaser: Making Proportional
Discovery (Finally) Work in Litigation by Requiring Phased Discovery, 4 STAN. J.
COMPLEX LITIG. 89, 106 (2016) [hereinafter Occam’s Phaser] (“What this Article
proposes is that, in many cases, judges should be required to create scheduling orders
to require the parties to ‘phase’ discovery.”).
189 See, e.g., Lifetime Prods., Inc. v. Russell Brands, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-00026-DNEJF, 2013 WL 12131594, at *2 (D. Utah June 26, 2013) (phasing email discovery to
start with fifteen custodians most likely to have material information).
190 See, e.g., In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 609 (8th
Cir. 2011) (noting that the district court phased discovery in a class action, starting
with only class certification issues); Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 7 n.15
(1st Cir. 2002) (“In phasing the trial of the case, the court will ordinarily phase
discovery as well. Reopening discovery on a plaintiff’s municipal liability claims
remains an option in the unlikely event that the municipality chooses not to satisfy an
adverse phase one judgment.”).
191 See, e.g., Murphy, Occam’s Phaser, supra note 188, at 91-93, 106.
192 Id. at 112.
193 See W.D. PA. LOCAL CIV. CT. R. 26.2(C).
187
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quickly getting them the most relevant information and by avoiding
overproduction issues.194
Another proposed reform calls for delaying discovery until after
summary judgment when the discovery dispute involves a close call
about a costly process.195 This proposal contends that courts should
consider the chances that the plaintiff will prevail at trial when
assessing the benefits of discovery.196 And, thus, the suggestion moves
difficult discovery issues to a stage in the litigation in which the judge
has more information without creating an inflexible hard stop.197
An almost mirror proposal is to permit limited pre-suit or predismissal discovery to counteract potential information asymmetries
and over-screening.198 The early sharing helps plaintiffs by giving
them more information with which to craft their pleadings while also
potentially lowering the overall costs to defendants by improving the
chances of early settlement or even the abandonment of the suit.199
Both Texas and Florida have experimented with this sort of discovery,
finding that it tends to have these benefits.200
2.

Active Judicial Management to Foster Cooperation

Active judicial management to encourage cooperation amongst the
parties is another reform technique that is frequently used.201 The
presentations of both the active judicial management and the
cooperation might vary widely across cases but the practices are
generally designed to avoid unnecessary disputes — and the associated
costs — while still bringing in the information that the parties need to
present their case.202
194 See Liesa L. Richter, Making Horses Drink: Conceptual Change Theory and
Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1669, 1691 (2013) (“Should a
requesting party voice legitimate concerns about ESI dumping, the trial judge can
utilize phased discovery to require targeted and sequential productions that are
manageable.”).
195 Moss, supra note 34, at 926.
196 Id. at 911.
197 See id. at 926-28.
198 See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 69-72
(2010) (proposing this sort of limited discovery in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal).
199 Id. at 73-74.
200 See id. at 74-75.
201 See, e.g., Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL
4498465, at *16-17 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012); see also Favro & Pullan, supra note 173,
at 953; K. Alex Khoury, Electronic Discovery, 68 MERCER L. REV. 971, 980 (2017)
(“[C]ourts are taking seriously the commitment to cooperation.”).
202 See The Sedona Conference, The Case for Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339,
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In this context, the term “cooperation” refers to inter-party behavior
that promotes information sharing and discourages waste.203 Two
concrete examples are when parties share information about
production decisions or affirmatively circumscribe requests.204
As described in more detail below, the increased active judicial
management might take the form of increased use of sanctions, closer
supervision of discovery processes, a push for the use of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms to address ESI-related discovery issues,
the promotion of technological aids, or more formal rule changes.205

339 (2009) [hereinafter The Case for Cooperation].
203 The Sedona Conference defines cooperation as follows:
Cooperation in this context is best understood as a two-tiered concept. First,
there is a level of cooperation as defined by the Federal Rules, ethical
considerations and common law. At this level, cooperation requires honesty
and good faith by the opposing parties. Parties must refrain from engaging in
abusive discovery practices. The parties need not agree on issues, but must
make a good faith effort to resolve their disagreements. If they cannot
resolve their differences, they must take defensible positions.
Then, there is the second level. While not required, this enhanced
cooperative level offers advantages to the parties. At this level, the parties
work together to develop, test and agree upon the nature of the information
being sought. They will jointly explore the best method of solving discovery
problems, especially those involving electronically stored information
(“ESI”). The parties jointly address questions of burden and proportionality,
seeking to narrow discovery requests and preservation requirements as
much as reasonable. At this level, cooperation allows the parties to save
money, maintain greater control over the dispersal of information, maintain
goodwill with courts, and generally get to the litigation’s merits at the
earliest practicable time.
Id.
204

See id.
See Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, Limiting Evasive Discovery: A Proposal
for Three Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 473, 483
(2010) (proposing an amendment to Rule 34 to prevent the use of boilerplate
objections); Grimm, supra note 107, at 132-33, 177-78 (discussing the advantages of
early meetings with the litigants); David R. Hague, Fraud on the Court and Abusive
Discovery, 16 NEV. L.J. 707, 730 (2016) (arguing that abusive discovery conduct can
be considered a sanctionable fraud on the court); Marian Riedy et. al., Mediated
Investigative E-Discovery, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 79, 91-92 (2010) (discussing ESI
mediation); Schaefer, supra note 55, at 6-7 (proposing an invigorated judge-enforced
discipline system for document discovery abuse).
205
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Sanctions

In defining the pressures of ESI on discovery, one frequent refrain is
that judges need to do more to rein in lawyers’ abusive conduct.206
Even judges have commented, “[L]itigators and trial lawyers do not
deserve all the blame for obstructionist discovery conduct because
judges so often ignore this conduct, and by doing so we reinforce —
even incentivize — obstructionist tactics.”207 And, thus, one set of
proposed solutions focuses on the use of sanctions to reduce the
amount of gamesmanship in ESI discovery. In these schemes, judges
are encouraged to use sanctions when attorneys mislead an opposing
party or do not perform a duty owed to an opposing party such as
filing frivolous discovery requests, not being transparent in their
objections, or permitting the spoliation of evidence.208
b.

Informal Guidance and Close Supervision of Discovery Processes

While sanctions are a stick that courts often are reluctant to use,
courts have many other tools to promote cooperation as part of their
case supervision. For example, some courts provide informal guidance
about the appropriate contours of document discovery requests or
permit parties to use informal methods (e.g., joint letters) to raise such
discovery issues.209 Courts also encourage the parties to cooperate by
206 See, e.g., Girard & Espinosa, supra note 205, at 483 (“The reluctance of courts
to impose sanctions under Rule 37 has encouraged the use of evasive and dilatory
behavior in response to discovery requests.”); cf. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST.
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF
THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM A-4 (2008) (reporting about
eighty-six percent of respondents who say that discovery sanctions are seldom
imposed); Dan H. Willoughby, Jr., et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 790 (2010) (identifying “230 sanction awards in 401 cases
involving motions for sanctions relating to the discovery of electronically stored
information (ESI) in federal courts prior to January 1, 2010”).
207 Sec. Nat’l Bank v. Abbott Labs., 299 F.R.D. 595, 597 (N.D. Iowa 2014), rev’d sub
nom. Sec. Nat’l Bank v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2015).
208 See Schaefer, supra note 55, at 26; see also John E. Motylinski, E-Discovery
Realpolitik: Why Rule 37(e) Must Embrace Sanctions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1605, 1643
(2015) (arguing for the application of sanctions if parties refuse to confer and attempt
to resolve issues related to lost ESI in good faith).
209 See Grimm, supra note 107, at 145 & n.71, 146 & nn.72-73 (citing Teck Metals,
Ltd. v. London Mkt. Ins., No. CV-05-411, 2010 WL 4813807, at *2, *4-9 (E.D. Wa.
Aug. 25, 2010) (resolving document discovery dispute with an order for the parties to
meet and confer while considering the judge’s suggestions about how to address the
raised issues), Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168, 2012 WL 1299379,
at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012) (permitting the use of informal letters), and other cases);
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offering direct exhortations.210 Additionally, they may educate the
parties about the benefits of cooperation and provide examples or
other instructional material to help effectuate that behavior.211 While
any of these techniques might help in the specific moment, more
active supervision of discovery by the court also can act as a
prophylactic against unproductive gamesmanship or actual
misconduct.212
c.

ESI Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

Parties may also be encouraged to mediate document discovery
disputes.213 Even if parties in a dispute do not agree to mediation, a
court might appoint a special master under Rule 53.214 This type of
less litigious approach should reduce the costs of dispute by forgoing
costly motion practice.215
The use of an alternative dispute resolution process alternatively
might take the form of outsourcing the discovery to a neutral thirdparty who takes on both the role of investigator and mediator.216 In
see also Hon. James G. Carr, Fixing Discovery: The Judge’s Job, 38 LITIG., Summer/Fall
2012, at 6, 6 (“[W]hat is needed to repair our current system — overly costly as it is
in both money and delay — is a willingness of judges to adjudicate discovery disputes
informally and promptly.”).
210 Grimm, supra note 107, at 149-50 & n.86 (citing Thompson v. C. & H. Sugar
Co., No. 12-CV-00391, 2014 WL 595911, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2014)).
211 Id. at 150 & nn.86 & 89 (citing Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253
F.R.D. 354, 357-61, 364-65 (D. Md. 2008), Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317,
2010 WL 4867346, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010), and other cases).
212 See id. at 147 (“Lawyers are less likely to initiate disproportionate discovery or
engage in discovery misconduct when they know the judge is watching and willing to
be contacted as soon as a problem arises.”). And this translates into fewer filed
discovery motions, enhancing the efficiency of the process. Id. at 147-48.
213 See Lawrence H. Kolin, Mediate ESI Issues Early and Get Back to the Merits of
Your Case, AM. B. ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/
dispute_resolution/Newsletter%20articles/Kolin.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept.
25, 2018); see also Steven C. Bennett, Mediation as a Means to Improve Cooperation in
E-Discovery, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 233, 236 (2014); Lela P. Love & Brian Farkas,
Silver Linings: Reimagining the Role of ADR Education in the Wake of the Great Recession,
6 NE. U. L.J. 221, 238 (2013) (recognizing growing use of neutrals for ESI disputes).
214 See Allison O. Skinner, Alternative Dispute Resolution Expands into Pre-Trial
Practice: An Introduction to the Role of E-Neutrals, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 113,
129 (2011).
215 See id. at 129-30.
216 See Riedy et al., supra note 205, at 91-92; see also Marian Riedy & Nancy
Greenwald, Mediating Discovery Disputes: When “Meet and Confer” Alone Is Not Enough,
17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 307, 308 (2016) (“Adapted appropriately to account
for the many differences between settling the case and agreeing on discovery issues,
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addition to reducing costs by sidestepping the costs involved in
formally contesting discovery issues before a court, trained ESI
investigator-mediators may help prevent certain issues from coming
up at all. For example, if engaged early, the investigator-mediator can
prevent the inadvertent destruction of evidence and other preservation
concerns.217 They also may improve the accuracy of the processes by
bringing their technical expertise.218 All of these benefits should help
with the efficiency of the process.219
To further explore the potential benefits of expert neutrals in ESI
disputes, as early as 2010, Judge Joy Flowers of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Western Pennsylvania created the Electronic
Discovery Special Masters program.220 And parties are agreeing to such
processes, even adding agreements to mediate ESI disputes into their
joint initial status reports.221
d.

Uniform Proportionality Analysis

Recognizing the benefits of standardization in preemptively
reducing conflicts, Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte — a magistrate judge
for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California —
and Jonathan M. Redgrave — a law firm partner and the chair
emeritus of The Sedona Conference Working Group on Best Practices
for Electronic Document Retention and Production — have proposed
a set of considerations that provide courts and parties with a
framework for considering proportionality issues in discovery (the
main battleground of ESI disputes).222 The framework calls for
however, ADR techniques and, specifically, mediation can be a uniquely efficient and
effective means of overcoming and preventing discovery disputes . . . .”).
217 Riedy et al., supra note 205, at 96-97.
218 See id. at 95-96; see also Daniel B. Garrie & Edwin A. Machuca, E-Discovery
Mediation & the Art of Keyword Search, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 467, 468-70
(2012).
219 See Riedy et al., supra note 205, at 97-98.
220 Jason R. Tashea, Courts Use Special Masters, Mediation to Help Solve E-Discovery
Issues, ABA J. (Jan. 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/courts_use_
special_masters_mediation_to_help_solve_e_discovery_issues.
221 See, e.g., Leading Logistics, Inc. v. B&B Logistics, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-06134, 2016
WL 8608401 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2016) (“At this point in time, the parties do not
anticipate e-discovery disputes. The parties agree that if they should arise, the parties
are willing to take the issues to the e-mediation panel.”).
222 Hon. Elizabeth D. Laporte & Jonathan M. Redgrave, A Practical Guide to
Achieving Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 9 FED. CTS. L.
REV. 19, 21 (2015) (describing the approach at a high level and suggesting it might
“standardize the approach to proportionality in discovery in the same manner that the
factors enumerated in Rule 23(a) have led to a largely standardized approach to class

2019]

Discovery Hydraulics

1355

consideration of the following practices: (1) focusing on the specific
discovery at issue; (2) recognizing that proportionality is interrelated
with relevance; (3) acknowledging that proportionality can support
non-binary decisions; (4) assigning the burdens on non-parties more
weight than those on parties; (5) raising discovery scope and
proportionality issues early in the litigation and then as necessary
throughout the litigation; (6) recognizing that the financial value of
the claim should not be the controlling factor; (7) acknowledging that
discovery will not be perfect; (8) robustly engaging in arguments
without relying on superseded case law, rote recitation of the rules, or
unsupported assertions about the burden of production; (9) avoiding
academic disputes regarding the burden of proof; and (10)
remembering that the proportionality factors also apply to
preservation issues.223 While Judge Laporte’s framework has not yet
been adopted wholesale, the identified factors are assessed in a wide
variety of cases.224
3.

Rule 34 Amendments and Standardized Discovery Protocols

Beyond the individual case management techniques described
above, there also are more system-wide reforms and proposals that
promote cooperation. While Rule 26 has long required litigants to
disclose, amongst other things, the names of individuals likely to have
discoverable information, a new example of a rule-based informationsharing mechanism is the 2015 amendments to Rule 34.
An early call to amend Rule 34 to expressly prohibit the use of
boilerplate objections came in 2010.225 And, in 2015, this call was
answered. As discussed earlier, Rule 34 now requires parties to state
objections to requests with specificity and to state whether anything is
being held on the basis of the objection.226 This rule change is meant
to enhance participation by giving the requesting party and the court
more information about the legal and practical issues at stake for the
producing party.227 Additionally, the overall efficiency of the case
certification briefing and decisions”).
223 Id. at 51.
224 See, e.g., State v. BP Am. Prod. Co., No. CGC12522063, 2016 WL 6270995, at
*1 n.1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2016) (citing to Judge Laporte’s article and stating that
the “factors are summarized in [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE] § 2019.030(a)”).
225 See Girard & Espinosa, supra note 205, at 482-83. In a similar vein, these
authors also proposed amending Rule 26(g) to directly prohibit evasive responses. See
id. at 477-79.
226 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
227 See Girard & Espinosa, supra note 205, at 483.
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should be improved by reducing the uncertainty about what is at issue
in both the case and any discovery disputes.228 Some, however, view
the 2015 amendments as insufficient and suggest enhancing the
penalties for continued non-compliance by adding a waiver clause to
Rule 34.229
Another more formal tool for reducing costs and promoting
cooperation is standardized discovery for specific case types. Just as
some courts have experimented with setting discovery limits for
certain types of claims to reduce costs and delays, there have been
mirror-like efforts for affirmative discovery disclosures in certain
contexts.230 For example, in 2011, the federal judiciary introduced a
pilot program that called for standardized discovery in employment
discrimination cases.231 The general concept was explored at the 2010
Duke Conference and employment cases were selected because they
appear frequently on federal dockets and there are fairly common
types of documents that show up in discovery.232 The protocols call
for the parties to exchange robust initial disclosures within thirty days
after the first responsive pleading or motion.233 And, the protocols
require the affirmative exchange of important information going to the
claim.234 For example, the plaintiff must share all documents related to
potential employment and the defendant has to turn over relevant
workplace policies and the plaintiff’s personnel file.235 And, while the
protocols do not prohibit additional discovery, they appear to do a
228

See id.
See, e.g., Amir Shachmurove, Policing Boilerplate: Reckoning and Reforming Rule
34’s Popular — Yet Problematic — Construction, 37 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 203, 273-74
(2017).
230 Compare examples in Part IV.A, with Laura McNabb, Pilot Project Reduces Delay
and Cost in Federal Litigation, 41 LITIG., Spring 2015, at 55, 56 (describing federal pilot
program), and Douglas L. Toering, Michigan’s Business Courts: Experimenting with
Efficiency and Enjoying the Results, 94 MICH. B.J., Nov. 2015, at 38, 39 (describing
Macomb County Circuit Court’s initial discovery protocols “for disputes involving
breach of contract, business organizations (shareholder disputes), employment, and
noncompete cases”). Several states also have standardized interrogatories for
employment discrimination cases, but that does not really address the ESI volume
issue that is the focus of this Article. See Jessica Erickson, Heightened Procedure, 102
IOWA L. REV. 61, 79 & n.80 (2016) (noting this pattern and citing California’s form
interrogatories as an example).
231 See McNabb, supra note 230, at 55-56.
232 Id. at 56.
233 Id.
234 See id.
235 Id.; see also Mirmina v. Genpact LLC, No. 3:16CV00614(AWT), 2017 WL
2559733, at *4 (D. Conn. June 13, 2017) (noting application of protocols in case).
229
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good job of anticipating most parties’ needs.236 A 2015 study found
that pilot cases saw less motion activity with about half the average
number of discovery motions filed in pilot cases as against the average
number in comparison cases.237
4.

Technological Tools

Another area of document discovery reform involves the use of
technological tools like predictive coding. Predictive coding is a form
of technology-assisted review in which supervised machine-learning
software is taught to predict the relevance of collected documents for
discovery productions.238 Surveys of legal practitioners, reviews of
discovery opinions, and IT-service providers all show increasing use of
predictive coding,239 which can be a cost-effective way of dealing with
voluminous ESI.240 In addition to the cost savings, it also has been
shown to lead to more accurate results.241
Illustrating how these concerns can play out, in a tax case from
2014, a court ordered the use of predictive coding over the requesting
party’s objections where an expert witness credibly demonstrated that
the use of predictive coding would reduce the ESI discovery costs from
about $500,000 to about $80,000.242 Going directly to the notions of
participation and information-sharing, the tax court noted that its
decision was, in part, predicated on the producing party’s
representations that they would work with the requesting party to
craft an acceptable protocol.243
236 See, e.g., Torcasio v. New Canaan Bd. of Ed., No. 3:15CV00053(AWT), 2016
WL 299009, at *14 (D. Conn. Jan. 25, 2016), reconsideration denied, No.
3:15CV00053(AWT), 2016 WL 1275028 (D. Conn. Apr. 1, 2016) (denying a motion
to compel because the plaintiff’s requests for production were “largely duplicative of
mandated disclosures provided in the initial discovery protocol”).
237 EMERY G. LEE III & JASON A. CANTONE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT ON PILOT
PROJECT REGARDING INITIAL DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS FOR EMPLOYMENT CASES ALLEGING
ADVERSE ACTION 1 (2015), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2016/Discovery%
20Protocols%20Employment.pdf.
238 Endo, supra note 2, at 834.
239 Id. at 837-39 (describing reports).
240 See Brown, supra note 147.
241 See Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in
E-Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 52 (2011).
242 Dynamo Holdings Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r, 143 T.C. 183, 194 (2014).
243 Id. at 192 (contrasting this display of transparency and cooperation with
Progressive Cas. Ins. v. Delaney, No. 2:11–cv–00678–LRH–PAL, 2014 WL 3563467, at
*10-12 (D. Nev. July 18, 2014), where the court denied a request to use predictive
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Protective Orders

An additional procedural mechanism that can reduce the costs of
discovery while promoting more information sharing is the protective
order. Rule 26(c) authorizes a court to issue a protective order to
prevent “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense.”244 Protective orders are commonly entered into by
stipulation rather than contested motion.245 They can reduce the need
for intensive screening because they remove the publicity risk of
turning over sensitive documents whose relevance or privilege might
otherwise be contested.246 Additionally, protective orders can be
crafted to permit information sharing with future litigants, creating a
system-wide efficiency.247
C. Cost-Shifting and Information-Scalable
A third set of reforms focuses on judicial reallocation of the costs of
document discovery involving ESI. Judges have long had the power to
shift costs and there are many examples where courts did so in the
face of voluminous ESI, even going back more than a decade.248 In a
notable case from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York, plaintiffs in a commercial dispute involving allegations of
discrimination and anti-competitive practices were forced to bear the
costs of producing emails from back-up tapes and hard drives because
requests were extremely broad, the back-ups were not ordinarily
accessible to the defendants, the costs were high, and the plaintiffs
claimed that they could limit the costs of the discovery.249 And there
are many proposals to more systemically introduce cost-shifting,
usually involving some initial threshold that, once breached, permits
coding).
244 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
245 See Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2001) (noting that stipulated protective orders have become commonplace); see
also Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 2 (1983) (noting that “most protective orders are entered by stipulation rather
than on motion”).
246 See Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use of Limits of Confidentiality
in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 332 (1999).
247 See Benham, supra note 59, at 2182-85.
248 See, e.g., Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8308 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (noting that Rule 26(c)
permits courts to shift discovery costs).
249 Rowe Entm’t, Inc., 205 F.R.D. at 423, 428-32.
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shifting discovery costs to the losing party.250 As discussed above in
Section III, concerns about cost have been the main driver of recent
reforms and, thus, cost-shifting proposals focus simply and directly on
how this burden is allocated.
The general presumption of discovery is that the responding party
bears the costs of production.251 And some argue that there is no need
to upset this presumption in cases involving voluminous ESI because
“if a party chooses an electronic storage method, the necessity for a
retrieval program or method is an ordinary and foreseeable risk.”252
Additionally, placing all of the costs on the requesting party, though,
may lead litigants without significant resources to abandon
meritorious claims simply because they cannot afford the upfront
expense of the necessary discovery.253
On the other hand, the general presumption may have less force in
cases involving ESI because of how it differs from paper records. With
ESI, a party may decide to retain data because the retention costs are
effectively zero, shifting the question from whether the data is worth
retaining to whether it is worth discarding it.254 Additionally, as with
backup tapes, the retention might only be a safeguard against a
catastrophic destruction of the general operations of the organization’s
computer systems, not a system for general use.255 Moreover, when a
250 See Steven Baicker-McKee, The Award of E-Discovery Costs to the Prevailing
Party: An Analog Solution in a Digital World, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 397, 424-25 (2015);
Samantha J. Kwartler, Postjudgment Cost Shifting: Electronic Discovery and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920(4), 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1311, 1312 (2015); Karel Mazanec, Capping EDiscovery Costs: A Hybrid Solution to E-Discovery Abuse, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 631,
654 (2014); see also Laura E. Ellsworth & Robert Pass, Cost Shifting in Electronic
Discovery, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 125, 125 (2004); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and
Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621, 1644-45 (2012); Richard A.
Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L.
REV. 647, 684-87 (2011); Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future:
Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773,
780 (2011). See generally Edward Pekarek, The Shifting Tide of ESI Discovery Cost
Allocation, 1899 PLI/CORP 405 (2011) (proposing that cost-shifting frameworks can
effectively help resolve discovery disputes regarding inaccessible ESI).
251 See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 358 (“[T]he presumption is that the
responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests . . . .”);
Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 465, 466 (1994).
252 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, 1995 WL
360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).
253 Rowe Entm’t, Inc., 205 F.R.D. at 429.
254 Id.
255 Id.; see also Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil
Litigation, SF97 ALI–ABA 1079, 1085 (2001).
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requesting party bears the costs, the requesting party presumably will
only ask for documents that satisfy a reasonable cost-benefit
analysis.256 And this approach presumably lets the requesting party
scale its information requests.
Given these competing factors, many courts have adopted a
balancing approach that considers:
(1) [T]he specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the
likelihood of discovering critical information; (3) the
availability of such information from other sources; (4) the
purposes for which the responding party maintains the
requested data (5) the relative benefit to the parties of
obtaining the information; (6) the total cost associated with
production; (7) the relative ability of each party to control
costs and its incentive to do so; and (8) the resources available
to each party.257
This balancing, however, still tends to lead to a binary result where
one party or the other bears the costs of the production.258
Additionally, its application tends to favor the shifting of costs instead
of providing a neutral test.259
Recognizing the problems of a binary approach, particularly in a
world in which the expense of ESI discovery can quickly approach the
value of a claim, Professor Steven Baicker-McKee suggests that, at their
discretion, courts may shift these as taxable costs at the end of
adjudications under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and its
256 See, e.g., Rowe Entm’t, Inc., 205 F.R.D. at 429; see also Marnie H. Pulver,
Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic Benefit of Pay-Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.
1379, 1424 (2000).
257 Rowe Entm’t, Inc., 205 F.R.D. at 429.
258 See, e.g., MariCal, Inc. v. Cooke Aquaculture, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-00366-JDL,
2016 WL 9459260, at *3 (D. Me. Aug. 9, 2016) (denying the defendants’ request that
the plaintiffs be ordered to pay for the costs of the search and production of requested
ESI); Ashmore v. Allied Energy, Inc., No. 8:14-CV-00227-JMC, 2016 WL 301169, at
*2-4 (D.S.C. Jan. 25, 2016) (denying motion seeking to shift costs of copying
requested documents). But see Bailey v. Brookdale U. Hosp. Med. Ctr., No.
CV162195ADSAKT, 2017 WL 2616957, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2017) (allocating
forty percent of the costs of the plaintiff’s ESI production to the defendants).
259 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“But
there is little doubt that the Rowe factors will generally favor cost-shifting. Indeed, of
the handful of reported opinions that apply Rowe or some modification thereof, all of
them have ordered the cost of discovery to be shifted to the requesting party.”). To
better keep the presumption that the producing party assumes the costs of discovery,
the Zubulake court eliminated the Rowe test’s specificity-of-request and purposes-kept
considerations. Id. at 321-22.
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companion statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).260 He grounds this suggestion
in a detailed analysis of the history of and rationales for cost-switching
in the American litigation system.261 Particularly saliently, BaickerMcKee describes how courts already can — and do — use Rule
26(c)(1)(B) to shift costs.262 Baicker-McKee lays out the factors that
should guide the judges’ discretion, listing the nature of the discovery
activities, the actual benefits achieved, the parties’ efforts to minimize
costs, and the merits of the claims and defenses.263 And, he explains
that the process might include discussions at the Rule 26(f) and Rule
16 conferences.264 An interesting wrinkle to Baicker-McKee’s proposal
is that the timing of the allocation decision (at the close of a case)
means that the court should have the best possible insight into the
merits of the case and the probative value of the information
transferred through the discovery processes.265
In a more radical approach that discards more than seventy years of
history and engages in a revitalized first-principles inquiry, Professor
Martin Redish and Colleen McNamara argue that the producing party
should be able to recover its reasonable discovery costs under a theory
of “quantum meruit.”266 First, they explain how the quantum meruit
recovery doctrine — which permitted courts to order compensation
when the defendant received a benefit at the plaintiff’s expense —
illustrates the general principle that it would is unjust for a party to
retain a benefit without paying compensation when the service was
not gratuitously performed.267 Then, mapping document discovery
practices to this doctrine, they identify how the producing party
incurs direct financial costs related to finding and sharing the
documents while the requesting party receives the benefits of
potentially helpful information.268 They further support their
suggestion by noting that it should improve the overall efficiency of
discovery processes by tying costs to decision-control, which should
reduce discovery abuse, and by allocating the costs to the lowest-cost

260

Baicker-McKee, supra note 250, at 424-26.
Id. at 418-22.
262 Id. at 421 & n.166 (citing Kirschenman v. Auto-Owners Ins., 280 F.R.D. 474,
487 (D.S.D. 2012) as an example).
263 Id. at 425.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 426.
266 Redish & McNamara, supra note 250, at 784-91.
267 Id. at 784-85.
268 Id. at 788-89.
261
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avoider.269 At least one court has implicitly communicated its support
for this position.270
D. Case for Cost-Reducing, Information-Neutral/Information-Positive
Innovations
One premise of this Article is that the combination of finite
litigation resources and virtually infinite discoverable material means
that document discovery rules and doctrines will have to make
difficult tradeoffs amongst the procedural justice norms of accuracy,
efficiency, and participation. But balancing these norms can, at some
point, reduce to a values-preference.271 And, in the procedure
literature, normative prioritizations often go unarticulated, which
leads to a regular and fair critique of many solutions that ask courts to
make non-pecuniary procedural tradeoffs.272
The unspoken normative assumptions also may lead to
inconsistencies in practice where the court decisions managing ESI
discovery issues can seem especially ad hoc.273 For example, in an
269

Id. at 796-98.
Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 338 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
(citing the article after explaining that “[b]ecause of the asymmetrical discovery in the
case, the Court informed the parties that it was likely to impose on the plaintiff at least
some portion of the expenses associated with its extensive discovery requests”).
271 See Bernadette Bollas Genetin, “Just A Bit Outside!”: Proportionality in Federal
Discovery and the Institutional Capacity of the Federal Courts, 34 REV. LITIG. 655, 689
(2015).
272 See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 228 n.6
(2009) (“[F]ew writers on procedure have attempted to elaborate any detailed theory
of fairness, and because most who draw on notions of fairness make their points
briefly or leave their ideas about fairness implicit.”); Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair
Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV.
485, 488-89 (2003) (“[D]iscussions of fairness in civil procedure are, with only a few
exceptions, rather thinly developed.”); Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 146, at 532
(noting that “the literature does not clearly state what the appropriate criteria of
fairness might be”). Moreover, some commentators have questioned whether courts
are the institutional body best situated to make these sorts of difficult normative
judgment calls. See, e.g., Genetin, supra note 271, at 689-92. Both the definitional
ambiguity and the institutional competence question may explain why many notions
of fairness turn then just on the economic efficiency issue — if nothing else, it is
relatively easy to measure and compare. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 146, at
532-33.
273 Recall that Rule 26(b)(1)’s proportionality limitation has a number of factors
but does not provide any weighting. And, as one scholar has remarked, “Such openended, multi-factor tests breed uncertainty and are subject to manipulation.” Jay
Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 876 (2015); see also Laporte &
Redgrave, supra note 222, at 21 (“Moreover, the authors further contend that this
270
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important discovery case, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake
III), the value of the employment discrimination claim was estimated
to be at least $15 million by the plaintiff and $1.2 million by the
defendant.274 The challenged ESI discovery costs were $165,000.275
And, while the court found that this was not significantly
disproportionate, it still shifted a quarter of the expense to the
plaintiff.276 On the other hand, in an employment case involving the
non-payment of wages, a different district court ordered ESI discovery,
which the defendants estimated would cost about $150,000 when the
amount in controversy was about $1 million, without any costshifting.277
Judge Laporte’s tool for evaluating proportionality in discovery, in
part, is designed to bring more uniformity to these sorts of
evaluations.278 But one element essential to true consistency in
document discovery is explicitly prioritizing the procedural justice
norms. As Professor Solum explains:
Accuracy, cost, and participation must all play a role in a
theory of procedural justice. But if such a theory is to be
sufficiently specific to do actual work as a standard against
which a system of procedure can be measured, then the
relationship between accuracy, cost, and participation must be
ordered and articulated.279
This ordering can be theoretically fraught and contentious.280 Some
suggest that the ordering should be drawn from observations of
practice.281 Another variation asks what institutional actors actually
methodology will leave less room in discovery disputes for extended forays into purely
ideological debate while providing much needed consistency for courts in
understanding and addressing the disputes.”).
274 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
275 Id. at 287-88.
276 Id. at 291.
277 Ball v. Manalto, Inc., No. C16-1523 RSM, 2017 WL 1788425, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. May 5, 2017) (granting motion to compel). The amount in controversy is
found in the complaint, and the discovery costs are in the defendant’s opposition to
the motion to compel.
278 Laporte & Redgrave, supra note 222, at 50-51.
279 Solum, supra note 20, at 305.
280 See Richard Marcus, Confessions of a Federal “Bureaucrat”: The Possibilities of
Perfecting Procedural Reform, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 103, 105 (2007) (“Unless all can
agree on how to resolve those basic value choices, the vision of a perfect procedural
system is something of a chimera.”).
281 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking,
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 940-41 (1999).
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prefer.282 An alternative approach focuses on the vindication of
individual rights over economic efficiency.283
But, when considering how these norms play out in document
discovery, accuracy and participation should rarely directly conflict
and, instead, likely will be positively correlated. At the theoretical
level, processes that do not guarantee a reasonable degree of accuracy
are likely to impair notice and participation rights.284 At the tactical
level, both should be enhanced by greater information transfers and,
accordingly, should favor the second category of cost-reducing,
information-neutral/information-positive reforms (“CRIN/IPs”).285
And even without putting a thumb on the scale for the accuracy and
participation norms, there are a number of reasons to favor these
reforms.
First, the cost-reducing, information-reducing/information-neutral
reforms (“CRIR/Ins”) might be a solution in search of a problem. In
the FJC’s study prepared for the Duke Conference, about ninety
percent of attorneys agreed that discovery in the given case yielded
just the right amount or too little information, showing general
agreement about proportionality.286 Moreover, the FJC study showed
that discovery costs were very small relative to the stakes of the case,
reaching only about three percent in half of the cases with reported
discovery.287
Second, to the extent that over-discovery is a real issue, it is not
obvious that the CRIR/INs will solve it.288 To this, attorneys in Arizona
(which has implemented one of the CRIRs in its state system) still
believe that litigation is too expensive.289

282 See, e.g., Michalski, supra note 134, at 35 (noting conflict in prioritization of
procedural justice norms across different groups).
283 See, e.g., Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 IOWA L.
REV. 1633, 1634 (2017); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 974-75
(1987).
284 See Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 547, 560-61 (2013).
285 See supra Part II.C.
286 Moore, Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments, supra note 99, at 1113.
287 Id.
288 See Lee & Willging, Defining the Problem, supra note 140, 765-66.
289 Quintanilla, Human-Centered, supra note 166, at 781. See generally Lonny
Hoffman, Examining the Empirical Case for Discovery Reform in Texas, 58 S. TEX. L.
REV. 209 (2016) (describing continued call for cost-focused reforms despite history of
efforts and lack of empirical support regarding the scope of the problem).

2019]

Discovery Hydraulics

1365

Third, the CRIN/IPs appear to be self-reinforcing. For example,
Judge Grimm explained how phasing discovery promotes increased
interactions amongst the attorneys, leading to better cooperation.290
This benefit also follows from the use of sampling and the attendant
negotiations.291
Fourth, just as the CRIN/IPs might create a virtuous cycle of
interparty interactions, promoting these reforms might also promote
the other two procedural justice norms. The CRIN/IPs tend to bring in
more (or better) information, which should improve the accuracy
norm.292 And more accurate processes might, ultimately, be more
efficient because they avoid unnecessary disputes and additional
efforts such as appeals.293
These reasons, however, do not suggest that CRIN/IPs are always
the right answer. With the potential deluge of ESI, many proposals
will need to be tried. And their effectiveness likely will vary based on
their specific features and the parameters of the particular case. For
example, the Federal Circuit has found that, in patent cases, the main
disputes tend to be around the patent itself, the products, prior art,
and damages.294 It thus concluded that expansive e-discovery, such as
mass email productions, is rarely directly helpful.295 This reasoning for
a targeted limitation nicely illustrates the potential distinction between
the quantity of documents in discovery and the quantity of material
information (at least one important measure of quality). Similarly,
sampling is probably not the best strategy in cases where the main cost
of producing the data is accessing it from an outdated legacy system or
when any key evidence is unlikely to be present in a small sample.296

290

Grimm, supra note 107, at 153-54.
Id. at 163.
292 See supra Part II.C; see also Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 24, at 2022; Miller,
Confidentiality, supra note 36, at 428; Sturm, supra note 24, at 1392; Sedona
Conference, The Case for Cooperation, supra note 202, at 358-59.
293 See J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme
Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 167 (1990) (noting that efficiency favors
avoiding more than one proceeding); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
163 (1982) (explaining how plain error rule “reflects a careful balancing of our need
to encourage all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around
against our insistence that obvious injustice be promptly redressed”) (emphasis
added).
294 E-DISCOVERY MODEL ORDER 2 (FED. CIRCUIT ADVISORY COUNCIL 2011),
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/announcements/Ediscovery_Model_
Order.pdf.
295 Id.
296 See Moss, supra note 34, at 942.
291
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Finally, another factor that should be considered when evaluating
whether to use CRIN/IPs or other types of discovery reforms is the
purpose of the underlying statute.297 While discovery processes are
generally trans-substantive, privileging cost-efficient discovery
processes in a high-value contract case might be much less
problematic than one involving important civil rights where the
pecuniary damages are likely to be small.298
E. Non-Discovery Structural Reforms
It must be acknowledged that the taxonomy above does not include
reforms that fundamentally question any foundational elements of the
legal profession or current discovery practices. It also does not look
beyond reforms that are intrinsically discovery qua discovery efforts.
But, as briefly sketched out below, other structural changes have been
introduced to address the pressures identified in Section III and more
might follow.
Most far-reachingly, the heightened pleading standards of Twombly
and Iqbal can be understood as a response to the rising costs
associated with ESI discovery.299 While there is debate about whether
the decisions really changed anything in practice,300 the tightly
interwoven relationship between discovery and pleading has been
recognized since the early days of the modern rules.301 And the two
297 See Stephen B. Burbank, Proportionality and the Social Benefits of Discovery: Out
of Sight and Out of Mind?, 34 REV. LITIG. 647, 650-51 (2015); Stancil, supra note 283,
at 1652-53.
298 See generally Stancil, supra note 283 (noting that the application of transsubstantive procedural rule to heterogeneous cases fails to promote substantive
equality).
299 See, e.g., Blair-Stanek, supra note 21, at 4; Fitzpatrick, supra note 250, at 1622;
see also Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2285-86 (2012);
Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey Miller, An Information-Forcing Approach to the Motion
to Dismiss, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 437, 438 (2013); Endo, supra note 2, at 832-33; supra
note 33 and accompanying text.
300 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 250, at 1622 (“First, Twombly and Iqbal may not be
nearly as revolutionary as first meets the eye; as a practical matter, lower federal courts
long ago elevated pleading standards in the face of the exponential increases in
discovery costs faced by corporate defendants.”); see also Hubbard, supra note 165, at
35 (finding that “Twombly precipitated no significant change in dismissal rates, even
after accounting for selection effects”).
301 See Richard A. Michael, The Supreme Court’s New Notice Pleading Requirements:
Revolutionary or Evolutionary, 52 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 267, 272 & n.24 (2015) (citing
CHARLES EDWARD CLARK ET AL., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (2d ed.
1947) and Edson R. Sunderland, Improving the Administration of Civil Justice, ANNALS
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recent Supreme Court decisions have been critiqued along this
dimension because, amongst other issues, they create an all-or-nothing
method for addressing discovery costs.302
Evidentiary rules also have been subject to reform efforts directed at
dealing with the burdens of voluminous ESI. Most notably, in 2008,
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 was adopted to address the rising costs
of ESI discovery.303 The new rule protects against the inadvertent
waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product and it permits the
claw-back of the inadvertently produced material.304 By reducing the
penalty for inadvertent waiver, the rule should incentivize approaches
to ESI discovery that reduce the expense of lawyers’ pre-production
review.305 To give a sense of the amounts that might be at stake, at a
public hearing on Rule 502, a corporation represented that it spent
$13.5 million on outside privilege review expenditures in one case.306
Professional practices have adapted in response the pressures of ESI
too. For example, some lawyers are exploring public social media —
one driver of the growth of ESI — to investigate their cases either
before initiating litigation or to supplement traditional discovery.307
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., May 1933, at 74-75); see also Subrin, Fishing Expeditions,
supra note 41, at 722.
302 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 250, at 1643-44 (explaining problems — such
as the binary nature of the decision — of using heightened pleading standards to
control discovery costs).
303 See Act of Sept. 19, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537 (2008) (adoption
of rule); FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“In drafting the proposed Rule,
the Advisory Committee concluded that the current law on waiver of privilege and
work product is responsible in large part for the rising costs of discovery, especially
discovery of electronic information.”); George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information
Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 3 (2007); Richter,
supra note 194, at 1669.
304 FED. R. EVID. 502; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (laying out mechanism for
claw-back).
305 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(discussing potential for claw-back agreements as a means of reducing costs of
attorneys reviewing voluminous ESI); Richter, supra note 194, at 1678 (describing
expense of pre-production review, including a study attributing seventy percent of
cost of discovery to it). But see Tonia Hap Murphy, Mandating Use of Predictive Coding
in Electronic Discovery: An Ill-Advised Judicial Intrusion, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 609, 646
(2013) (discussing why benefits of rule might not be sufficient to force the use of
technologies like predictive coding over which there is less individualized human
attention applied to reviewing each document).
306 Richter, supra note 194, at 1678 (citing Hearing of the Advisory Comm. on
Evidence Rules 86-88 (Jan. 29 2007), http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2007/WebPDFs/
ERcommTranscript01-29-07.pdf (testimony of Patrick Oot, Dir. of Electronic
Discovery & Senior Counsel, Verizon).
307 See John G. Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of Evidence
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Given its potential efficacy, several commentators have even suggested
that this sort of informal discovery now is ethically required in certain
cases.308
CONCLUSION
The growth of ESI has sparked many calls for document discovery
reforms, some of which have been implemented and some of which
have yet to be applied. But the pressures of ESI, whether now or in the
not-too-distant future, means there are no easy answers and difficult
normative tradeoffs amongst the accuracy, efficiency, and participation
norms will have to be made. Some of these choices — such as those
going to broad social aims — might be best made in the legislature.
Other choices — such as those that deal with individual rights or case
management — are better left to the judiciary. But, regardless of the
source, to best serve the fundamental procedural justice norms, the
document discovery reforms that attempt to reduce costs while
preserving the benefits of the information trove should be encouraged.
By reducing costs, these reforms serve efficiency. And by preserving
the amount and quality of information transferred, they also promote
accuracy and participation. With that said, a familiar caveat to any
proposed discovery reform (and to many articles discussing them) is
the need for empirical research to better gauge their effectiveness.309
from Social Media Sites, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 467 (2011) (“A February
2010 study conducted by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers revealed
that [eighty-one percent] of the attorneys responding reported finding and using
evidence from social networking sites in their cases.”).
308 See, e.g., Stacey Blaustein et al., Digital Direction for the Analog Attorney — Data
Protection, E-Discovery, and the Ethics of Technological Competence in Today’s World of
Tomorrow, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 64 (2016) (discussing N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm.
on Prof’l & Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 2010-2, at 1 (2010), http://www.nycbar.
org/Ethics/eth2010.htm (asserting that the “potential availability of helpful evidence
on these internet-based sources makes them an attractive new weapon in a lawyer’s
arsenal of formal and informal discovery devices”)); Agnieszka McPeak, Social Media
Snooping and Its Ethical Bounds, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 845, 887-88 (2014) (arguing that
lawyers still have ethical duties regarding public social media searches); Peter Segrist,
How the Rise of Big Data and Predictive Analytics Are Changing the Attorney’s Duty of
Competence, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 527, 558-59 (2015) (noting “some even persuasively
argu[e] that there exists an ethical obligation upon attorneys to investigate an
opponent’s social networking information”).
309 See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 97, at 263-64 (noting the importance of
knowing the empirical effects of discovery limits); see also Beisner, supra note 72, at
578; Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example
of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1940 (1989) (“We need fewer mind experiments
and more field experiments, procedural rules as well as procedural theories that are
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And that goes for the suggestions in this Article too, which hopefully
will encourage a continued, robust debate as many reforms are tried.

‘based on experience.’”); Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of
Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 770-71 (1995); Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New
Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure
Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (2005)
(“There has been widespread scholarly criticism of . . . the paucity of sound empirical
research to inform the flurry of discovery reforms . . . .”); Richard L. Marcus,
Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 778 (1998) (“As a general matter,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been drafted without the benefit of detailed
empirical input.”).

